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September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Con-
gress established the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
(the Fund) to assist the direct victims of these attacks and their fami-
lies. The Fund allowed for substantial payments from the United
States Treasury on a no-fault basis to persons who had sustained
physical injury and to family members of those who had died if they
would forego traditional tort remedies against the airlines and other
potential defendants. Conceived as part of a legislative scheme to
rescue the beleaguered airline industry, the Fund nevertheless evi-
denced compassion toward people who had suffered disproportionate,
horrible losses in an unprecedented national tragedy. Notwithstand-
ing its attractive features, both the substantive rules for compensa-
tion and the procedures employed by the Fund engendered
substantial criticism. At least for a time, it appeared that a substan-
tial number of potential claimants would forego claims against the
Fund and pursue traditional tort remedies. However, by the time the
Fund closed its doors, ninety-seven percent of those eligible to file
death claims with the Fund had done so.
In this article, I examine the September 11th Victim Compensa-
tion Fund from both a procedural and substantive standpoint. The
procedural analysis will look at both the "upstream" process, i.e., the
law-making process under which the legislation was enacted and the
rules for the Fund were established, and the "downstream" process
under which claims were resolved and compensation has been paid
out. Intertwined with the procedure are the substantive rules of re-
covery, including the largely formulaic means through which com-
pensation was determined with a minimum of fact-finding and
advocacy. I will examine how the administrative process dealt with a
legislative mandate that failed to clearly set forth whether the Fund
was to serve primarily as a means of providing emergency relief to
needy victims, or as an alternative means of tort recovery. Closely
linked to this discussion is the public perception of the fairness of the
Fund's compensation scheme, and what that might tell us about the
normative value of traditional rules of tort recovery. Both the proce-
dural and substantive elements of the Fund should generate reflec-
tion regarding the capability of the administrative process to respond
to disaster and, for that matter, the fairness and efficiency of the ad-
ministrative process in general.
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I have previously written about the Fund in communitarian
terms, suggesting that the Fund represents some of the noblest com-
munitarian impulses of the American people, although its compensa-
tion scheme (based largely on victims' income expectations) falls
somewhat short of the communitarian ideal.1 Others have written
about a variety of implications of the Fund, including tort reform, 2
procedural design,3 victim relief,4 and the psychology of compensa-
tion for harm.5 This article, while touching upon these perspectives,
will focus upon the Fund as a creature of the administrative process,
making both the rules necessary for its operation and the determina-
tions regarding compensation. I will suggest that, notwithstanding
objections regarding its "undemocratic" nature and flawed compensa-
tion scheme and procedures, the Fund represents some of the best
features of the administrative state, employing a dispute resolution
professional to refine the rules and deal with difficult questions in a
principled, if imperfect, manner. I will further suggest that the
Fund, like other schemes for compensation and dispute resolution,
should be judged on the basis of its limited objectives, and that when
so judged, the Fund has performed remarkably well.
The Fund's two major shortcomings were legislatively derived:
(1) a failure on the part of Congress to clearly articulate whether the
Fund was to serve primarily as a distributive justice mechanism to
provide emergency relief to disaster victims or as a corrective justice
measure providing victim compensation on the tort model; (2) a fail-
ure to provide a mechanism for review of the determinations made by
1. See ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. & ROBERT M. ACKERMAN, LAW AND COMMUNITY:
THE CASE OF TORTS 189-94, 198-214, 216-18 (2004).
2. See, e.g., Marshall Shapo, Compensation for Terrorism: What We Are Learn-
ing, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 813-817 (2003); Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness
in Compensating Victims of September 11, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573, 587-89 (2001);
Alan B. Morrison, Lessons To Be Learned: The Victim Compensation Fund, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 821, 826-829 (2003); Larry S. Stewart et al., The September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund: Past or Prologue?, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 153, 171-179 (2002);
Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the Victim Compensation Fund,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 731-753 (2003).
3. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror Victim Compen-
sation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 661-90 (2003).
4. See, e.g., Joe Ward, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: The An-
swer to Victim Relief, 4 PEFP. Disp. RESOL. L. J. 161, 167-76 (2003); Julie Goldscheid,
Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-9/11 World, 79 TULANE L. REV. 167, 195-220
(2004).
5. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on
Compensation for Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 386-391 (2003); Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searching
for Justice Through Compensation for Personal Injury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
417, 451-56 (2003).
[Vol. 10:135
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
the Fund's administrators. These deficiencies were corrected, for the
most part, by (1) administrative regulations that provided a humane
compromise between a rigid, tort-based formula and a softer, more
needs-based formula for compensation and (2) an efficient claims pro-
cess that provided claimants a respectful, user-friendly forum in
which to present their claims and obtain timely awards. The Fund
fell short only when measured against unrealistic expectations that a
process established to provide timely economic compensation for
enormous harm would either fully replicate remedies provided by the
slower, more cumbersome tort system or bring about a complete heal-
ing to those who have experienced heartbreaking loss.
Part II of this article describes the "upstream" process that cre-
ated the Fund, analyzing both the legislation that provided its frame-
work and the administrative rules that fleshed out the detail. Part
III examines the criticisms launched against the Fund, and how
those criticisms were addressed through principles of statutory and
administrative interpretation. Part IV examines the Fund's claims
experience and considers the choices available to the Fund's benefi-
ciaries. Finally, Part V evaluates the Fund in terms of principles of
democratic governance and reasonable expectations regarding mod-
ern-day legislative and administrative processes.
Along the way, we will encounter the following themes:
" Dynamic interpretation of statutes in the administra-
tive process. The legislation establishing the Fund appeared
to call for compensation through a tort-like, corrective justice
model, which tends to reward high income earners more than
those of modest means. However, the legislation also had ele-
ments of a social welfare program, distributing benefits in ac-
cordance with need. The Fund's Special Master developed
regulations that largely hewed to the tort compensation model
but which at the extremes tapered the greatest economic dis-
parities among claimants. While controversial, the regulatory
gloss on the Congressional mandate was by-and-large fair,
sensible, and politically expedient. It represents a dynamic in-
terpretation of the statute, largely to good effect.
* Democratic governance and the administrative process.
The processes employed by the Fund, while imperfect, fulfilled
the objective of providing quick, no-fault recovery in a user-
friendly manner. Notwithstanding departures from textbook
procedure, both the upstream processes under which the
Fund's rules were established and the downstream processes
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employed by the Fund to determine claims reflected values es-
sential to democratic governance, such as participation, indi-
vidual autonomy, and due process.
The normative value of tort law and procedure. Arising
out of a unique combination of events, the September 11th Vic-
tim Compensation Fund should be regarded as sui generis. It
is unlikely that any American government will provide no-
fault awards of the magnitude allowed by the Fund in re-
sponse to any future event. The Fund is therefore unlikely to
serve as a model for future tort reform. The experience of the
Fund nevertheless indicates that the norms of traditional tort
law and procedure (aided by statutory language) may have an
endowment effect, creating high expectations regarding the
sums to be awarded.
The need to evaluate the Fund in accordance with real-
istic expectations. The Fund, like any dispute resolution
mechanism, must be evaluated in terms of its limited objec-
tives and realistic expectations. The Fund has fulfilled its lim-
ited objectives: it has provided prompt and fair compensation
to those injured on September 11th and the families of those
who died that day; it has prevented an onslaught of suits
against the airlines and New York City; and it has provided "a
compassionate and collective response to an act of shocking
barbarity."6 No single remedy will fully address the conse-
quences of the events of September 11th and it is unrealistic to
evaluate the Fund as if it should.
A. Writing about September 11th
There is no doubt that the legal response to the horrific losses
incurred on September 11, 2001 was significant enough to merit ex-
ploration and discussion. Nevertheless, writing about September
1 1th is a humbling experience. More than three years after the tragic
events, it remains difficult to place them in proper historical perspec-
tive. As of this writing, Osama bin Laden remains at large, and his
Al Qaeda network remains a potent threat. While other, smaller (but
significant) terrorist attacks have occurred since September 11th, we
still do not know whether the events of that day were but the first in
a series of large-scale terrorist assaults on American targets, or if
they will continue to stand out as the most prominent and horrible
manifestation of a menace that the world will ultimately bring under
6. Editorial, 9/11 Fund Closes Its Doors, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at A30.
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control. The roots of evil are difficult to comprehend, and the signifi-
cance of events such as these is known only to God. 7 From this per-
spective, our efforts to construct meaning out of even the concrete
legal responses to the events of September 11th seem petty and fu-
tile, and to use such an exercise to demonstrate clever intellectual
footwork both crass and vulgar.
But it is the very nature of mankind to try to find meaning in
events, especially tragic events. Out of such meaning, we can at-
tempt to construct a better, albeit sadder world. The scholarship to
date on the September 11th tragedy evidences genuine concern for
the victims, for their families, and for others omitted from the com-
pensation scheme but for whom we might nevertheless have compas-
sion, as well as for a shocked nation that continues to grieve even as
it responds to the tragedy on several fronts.8 It is only natural that
scholars approach matters of consequence from the disciplinary per-
spectives with which they are familiar. I have taught and written
about torts and dispute resolution for twenty-four years. During the
past several years my scholarly interests have focused on communi-
tarianism; more recently, I struggled to teach a course in legislative
and administrative process. For me, then, it was only natural to
think about how these fields coalesced in the legal response to the
September 11th tragedy.
As far as I am aware, I personally know nobody who was killed
on September 11th. Like many Americans, I am familiar with a few
people closely connected to some of those murdered that day, includ-
ing the brother of a college acquaintance and the best friend of a stu-
dent's sister. Another student's brother escaped a building in the
World Trade Center complex just prior to its collapse, losing his base-
ball memorabilia collection but not his life. After the second plane
struck the World Trade Center, I telephoned my brother, who at the
time lived and worked in Northern Virginia, and suggested that he
stay clear from the Pentagon that day; moments later, that huge of-
fice building was also struck. I grew up in the New York area, and
have lived and worked most of my adult life within the geographic
triangle formed by New York City, Arlington, Virginia, and Shank-
sville, Pennsylvania. I never admired the World Trade Center as a
7. For a contemporary discussion of the nature of evil, see LANCE MORROW, EVIL:
AN INVESTIGATION (2003).
8. See, e.g., Shapo, supra note 2. See also Robert L. Rabin, The September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund: A Circumscribed Response or an Auspicious Model?, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 799-803 (2003).
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monument to architecture or good urban planning,9 but came to
value it as a symbol of a great city and global commerce, and more
importantly, as a place in which thousands of people worked and
spent a major portion of their days. I cannot think of September 11,
2001 without reliving the images of buildings in flames, people jump-
ing to their deaths, and the collapse of those great towers. In the
course of writing this article, I have had to pause many times, as
those images recurred. I can only guess at how those more closely
related to the victims feel.
The traditions and expectations of the academy are to write in
detached manner, and to narrowly compartmentalize one's analy-
sis.1° Scholars are trained and coached to analyze matters from the
professional perspective of a narrowly defined discipline, e.g., a com-
munitarian perspective of tort law, or a dynamic theory of statutory
interpretation. 1 ' The events of September 11th and their aftermath
do not lend themselves to such compartmentalization. The search for
meaning in such events involves many perspectives; law may be the
least of them. However, the legal response to tragedy can reflect our
compassion; it can also help us develop a sense of shared history and
construct community. I have argued elsewhere that community is
difficult, if not impossible, to construct out of process alone. 12 More
typically, it is a product of shared experience; sadly, this experience is
often one of shared pain. So it is altogether fitting to consider how
the legal responses to September 11th may evidence a communitar-
ian strain that is often submerged, but never quite extinguished, in
the law.
This is an article about administrative process, dispute resolu-
tion, and torts. It is an article written from a communitarian per-
spective. Most of all, however, it is an article about human loss, our
response to it, and the search for meaning and compassion in the
human experience.
9. For a critique of the sort of monumental development of which the World
Trade Center was a prominent example, see JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF
GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
10. New York Times columnist David Brooks recently wrote, "The academy en-
courages squirrel-like specialization." David Brooks, Learning to Think, and Live,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at A19.
11. This may be particularly true of legal scholars. Thomas Reed Powell, who
taught law at Harvard for twenty-five years, is credited with saying, "A legal mind is
a mind that can think of one of two inseparably connected things without thinking of
the other." LUcAs A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 500
(2000).
12. See Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the
Search for Community, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 28, 88-91 (2002).
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II. THE UPSTREAM PROCESS: ESTABLISHING THE SEPTEMBER 11TH
VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND
A. The Legislation
Any history of the Victim Compensation Fund legislation is nec-
essarily brief. On September 22, 2001, less than two weeks after the
attacks, Congress established the September 11th Victim Compensa-
tion Fund. The Fund was really an afterthought. In the wake of the
September 11th attacks, Congress and the Bush Administration saw
an acute need for legislation to protect the airline industry. That in-
dustry, already in precarious financial condition, was rocked by the
September 11th attacks, which brought down four large passenger
airplanes, forced a three-day interruption in commercial air traffic,
and provoked public concern regarding the safety of air travel. One
aspect of federal relief would be a limitation on recovery against the
airlines for the deaths and injuries that occurred on September 11th;
that provision would cap the victims' total recovery at the limits of
the airlines' liability insurance (a total of approximately $6 billion). 13
It was here that the plaintiffs' trial lawyers 14 and Congressional
Democrats stepped in, arguing that Congress could not limit the
rights of the victims without providing an alternative remedy. Con-
gressional staffers 15 therefore conceived of the Victim Compensation
Fund, which would provide compensation to September 11th victims
from the United States Treasury on a no-fault basis.
The measure establishing the Fund was enacted without conven-
tional hearings and with little floor debate. It was passed, together
with the other provisions of the Air Transportation Safety and Sys-
tem Stabilization Act (the "ATSSSA"),16 on September 22, 2001, a
mere eleven days after the events it was supposed to redress. Noted
one writer, "According to key participants in the process, almost no
time was spent discussing the moral or philosophical why's of the
13. Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 8, 2002, at 92, 94.
14. Most notably the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), which had
called for a moratorium on lawsuits stemming from September 11th, but did want to
see the victims compensated. See Call for Moratorium on Filing Over Terrorism, 24
PA. L. WKLY. 1097, 1097 (2001).
15. Steven Brill credits David Crane, a member of Senator Trent Lott's staff, as
the originator of the scheme for the Victim Compensation Fund. STEVEN BRILL, AF-
TER: How AMERICA CONFRONTED THE SEPTEMBER 12 ERA 84 (2003).
16. Section 101(a) of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act,
IV, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (West
2003)) (hereinafter ATSSSA), provided $5 billion in direct aid and $10 billion in loan
guarantees to the airline industry.
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plan."17 Indeed, at the time of passage, few people were inclined to
question the philosophy or mechanics of the Fund. The Fund re-
flected the national outpouring of grief and sympathy in the wake of
the unprecedented attacks of September 11th. The terrorist missions
were attacks on the nation, and Congress and the public regarded it
as altogether fitting that the nation as a whole should provide relief
to the most directly affected victims. The nuances of compensation
(and even their underlying rationale) could be ironed out through
regulations to be promulgated by the Attorney General, on advice of a
Special Master. In the meantime, the Victim Compensation Fund
stood as an example of the largess of the American people, wounded
by the most devastating attacks ever to strike American soil, but de-
termined to comfort the victims and pursue the enemy.
The legislative parameters of the Fund were simple. Those who
had suffered physical injury and families of those who had died in the
attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in the crash of
United Airlines Flight 93 near Shanksville, Pennsylvania would be
entitled to compensation on a no-fault basis.18 A Special Master
would be appointed by the Attorney General to assist in promulgat-
ing regulations and to administer the Fund. 19 The Special Master
was to determine, as to each eligible claimant, "(i) the extent of harm
to the claimant, including any economic and noneconomic losses; and
(ii) the amount of compensation to which the claimant is entitled
based on the harm to the claimant, the facts of the claim, and the
individual circumstances of the claimant."20 This determination was
to be made within 120 days after the claim was filed;21 all claims had
to be filed no later than two years after regulations were promulgated
(resulting in a final filing deadline of December 22, 2003).22 Eco-
nomic and noneconomic losses were defined in the ATSSSA:23 no pu-
nitive damages were to be awarded, 24 nor was negligence to be
considered. 25 In a departure from the usual rules for tort recovery,
collateral source compensation was to be deducted from the total
award. 26 Claimants were to have the right to be represented by an
17. Belkin, supra note 13, at 94.
18. ATSSSA § 405(b)(2).
19. Id. at § 404(a).
20. Id. at § 405(b)(1).
21. Id. at § 405(b)(3).
22. ATSSSA § 405(a)(3).
23. Id. at § 402(7), (9).
24. Id. at § 405(b)(5).
25. Id. at § 405(b)(2).
26. ATSSSA § 405(b)(6).
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attorney 27 and to present evidence; 28 however, the determinations of
the Special Master were to be "final and not subject to judicial
review."29
Those who filed claims with the Fund would be statutorily pre-
cluded from bringing a traditional tort action for injuries sustained in
the September 11th tragedy. 30 (Later amendments made it clear
that actions against the terrorists themselves were not precluded.
31)
Those who chose to bring such an action, rather than file with the
Fund, would be subject to several constraints: liability of any "air
carrier, aircraft manufacturer, airport sponsor, or person with a prop-
erty interest in the World Trade Center" would be limited to the in-
surance coverage maintained by such entity;32 liability of New York
City could not exceed the greater of the City's insurance coverage or
$350,000,000 (provided by later amendment);33 exclusive jurisdiction
for any such claims would be in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York,34 with the substantive law of the
state in which the crash occurred applying35 in what was described
as a federal cause of action.36
Thus, the September 11th victims would be provided the means
of obtaining a quick, certain recovery of substantial damages through
an administrative process in which they had limited due process
rights. Previous no-fault compensation systems (usually enacted on
the state level) had assured recovery regardless of fault, but had
sharply limited the amount recovered to a fraction of what would be
obtained in a traditional tort action. Worker's compensation, for ex-
ample, typically provides for medical expenses, a portion of wage loss,
and virtually nothing for pain and suffering or other noneconomic
losses. The formula adopted for the September 11th Victim Compen-
sation Fund, in contrast, seemed designed to yield recoveries more
closely resembling the larger amounts recoverable in fault-based tort
actions. This seemingly generous awards scheme, together with the
constraints on traditional tort actions imposed by the ATSSSA, were
to serve as incentives to bring claims against the Fund in lieu of
27. Id. at § 405(b)(4)(A).
28. Id. at § 405(b)(4)(B).
29. Id. at § 405(b)(3).
30. ATSSSA § 405(c)(3)(B).
31. Id. at § 405(c)(3)(B).
32. Id. at § 408(a)(1).
33. Id. at § 408(a)(3).
34. ATSSSA § 408(b)(3).
35. Id. at § 408(b)(2).
36. Id. at § 408(b).
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traditional tort actions against the airlines and other potential
defendants.
As emergency legislation, the Air Transportation System Safety
and Stabilization Act sailed through Congress, without protracted
hearings or committee markups. The most intensive discussion of
the legislation occurred during a late night meeting of Congressional
leadership in House Speaker Dennis Hastert's office on September
20.3 7 The following day's floor debate revealed that some members of
Congress had reservations about the legislation, but most of these
dealt with the fact that the ATSSSA provided substantial relief to the
airlines without direct relief to laid-off employees or provision for fed-
eralization of airport security.38 (Subsequent legislation would ad-
dress these concerns. 39) Regarding the Victim Compensation Fund,
somewhat inconsistent interpretations were provided on the floor of
the House and Senate. In the House of Representatives, Congress-
man Jon Spratt (D-S.Car.) remarked:
I wanted to propose that we set a fair but generous cap on the
victims' benefits paid by the government, and use some of the
money saved to help the thousands of airline workers who are
being terminated or laid off, and are in a real sense, victims of
the September 11 tragedy also. H. Resolution 244, the rule al-
lowing this bill to come to the House floor, would not permit me
to offer such an amendment, and for that reason, I voted against
the rule. I will vote for the bill, but it would be a much better
bill if such an amendment had been made.40
Ironically, Congressman Spratt's remarks would later be cited by
potential Fund claimants to support an unsuccessful claim that the
Special Master's regulations provided higher income victims with
less than the full recovery to which they were entitled under the
legislation.41
Earlier in the debate, Rep. John Sensenbrenner (R-Wisc.), the
Judiciary Committee Chairman, raised the concern (also voiced in
the session in Hastert's office by Rep. Nickles (R.-Okla.)) that the vic-
tim compensation provisions might set a precedent for similar com-
pensation provisions in the event of a future disaster.42 Three
37. See BRILL, supra note 15, at 95-97.
38. See 147 CONG. REC. H5894 (2001); 147 CONG. REC. H5922 (2001).
39. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(2001) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.; 26 U.S.C.; 31 U.S.C.; 49 U.S.C.).
40. 147 CONG REC. H5892 (2001).
41. See Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). For an
extensive discussion of this litigation, see infra notes 128-153 and accompanying text.
42. 147 CONG. REC. H5879-80 (2001).
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Congressmen inserted into the record a letter from ATLA President
Leo Boyle in support of the Victim Compensation Fund provisions. 43
Boyle would remain a staunch supporter of the Fund, while continu-
ing to assert that it should not serve as a template for general tort
reform.44
In the Senate, however, the debate took on a somewhat different
tone. Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) strongly suggested that the
Fund was intended to provide relief to victims, but not necessarily to
replicate traditional tort compensation.45 But otherwise, there was
little mention of the victim compensation provisions during the brief
debate prior to passage of the measure.
The ATSSSA was passed by a vote of 356 to 54 in the House and
96 to 1 in the Senate. It was immediately signed by President George
W. Bush. Congress revisited the legislation establishing the Fund in
November 2001, in the course of enacting the Aviation and Transpor-
tation Security Act (which dealt with matters of airport security and
established the Transportation Security Administration).46 The limi-
tations on liability were broadened to include potential defendants
other than airlines (including aircraft manufacturers and New York
City),4 7 language clarifying Fund claimants' ability to sue the ter-
rorists (notwithstanding a claim against the Fund) was added,48 and
some other language was cleaned up to reduce (but not eliminate)
ambiguity. 49 And on January 23, 2002 Congress passed the Victims
of Terrorism Tax Relief Act, which amended the Internal Revenue
Code to exempt from income tax the awards obtained from the
Fund.50
43. E.g. id. at H5914. Each Congressman did this in live debate within a few
minutes of the others.
44. See No Victim Left Behind, TRiAL MAG., Jul. 1, 2004, at 66 (while ATLA tradi-
tionally disfavors federal involvement in civil tort remedies, the executive committee
believed the Fund was an appropriate exception under extreme circumstances).
45. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
46. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(2001).
47. Id. at § 201(b).
48. Id. at § 201(a).
49. See id. at § 201(b)(2)(d) (clarifying definitions of "air carrier," "aircraft manu-
facturer," and "airport sponsor").
50. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat.
2427 (2002) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. 692 (West 2003)).
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B. The Regulations
1. Rulemaking Upstream
The legislative product that left the President's hands was short
on detail and even lacking in a coherent rationale. As a consequence,
months of debate and discussion as to whether the Fund was a tort-
type compensation scheme or a welfare-type relief measure followed.
The resolution of this debate would lie mostly within the administra-
tive process, with a brief (and, it would seem, obligatory) detour
through the courts.
In contrast with the hurried manner in which the underlying
statute was drafted and enacted, the "upstream" process of rulemak-
ing pursuant to the statute was about as thorough and inclusive as
the statutory time constraints would allow.51 The Act required that
"the Attorney General, acting through a Special Master appointed by
the attorney general,... promulgate all procedural and substantive
rules for administration of this title,"52 including regulations with re-
spect to (1) forms to be used in submitting claims, (2) information to
be included in such forms, (3) procedures for hearing and presenta-
tion of evidence, (4) procedures to assist an individual in filing and
pursuing claims, and (5) "other matters determined appropriate by
the Attorney General." 53 To this end, on November 5, 2001, the Jus-
tice Department published notice of inquiry and advance notice of
rulemaking and requested public input on a number of issues.54
Shortly thereafter (on November 26), the Attorney General appointed
Kenneth Feinberg as the Fund's Special Master. Feinberg seemed
particularly well-suited for the job; having served as Special Master
in the Agent Orange, DES, and Dalkon Shield cases, Feinberg was
adept at fashioning remedies in mass-tort cases. Despite his prior
association with Senator Edward Kennedy, a leading Democrat,
Feinberg was able to convince Republican Attorney General John
Ashcroft that he was the perfect person to take on this sensitive and
complex task.55 Political connections may have gotten Feinberg's foot
51. I use the terms "upstream" and "downstream" to distinguish between the "up-
stream" process of lawmaking (including rulemaking) and the "downstream" process
of applying the law (largely through individual determinations), both of which are
functions of a typical administrative agency and, in this instance, of the Special
Master.
52. ATSSSA at § 404.
53. Id., at § 407.
54. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,901
(Nov. 5, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104).
55. BRILL, supra note 15, at 133-34, 242.
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in the door, but professional expertise would make him an effective
administrator for the Fund.
In response to its notice of inquiry, the Justice Department re-
ceived more than 800 comments, from a variety of sources. 56 Many of
these comments were reflected in an Interim Final Rule published on
December 21, 2001.57 The Justice Department subsequently received
thousands of comments on the Interim Final Rule, many of them
through public and private meetings conducted by the Special Master
at various sites convenient to victims, victims' advocates, public offi-
cials, and others. 58 The revisions to the Interim Final Rule found in
the Final Rule (published March 13, 2002) reflect the serious consid-
eration given to these comments. Most of the revisions provided for
an expansion in benefits to victims and their families. 59 The process
through which the regulations were promulgated reflected several of
the values of democratic governance elaborated upon in Section V.A
of this article.60
While the statute seemed to anticipate regulations dealing pri-
marily with procedure, both the Interim Final Rule and the Final
Rule necessarily provided much as to substance, including formulae
for calculation of both economic and noneconomic components of the
awards and, subsequently, a series of tables indicating presumed
awards based on factors such as age, income, and marital status. 61
Critical to the ultimate awards would be the manner in which eco-
nomic and noneconomic losses were treated under the Special
Master's regulations and tables. The statute defined "economic loss"
as "any pecuniary loss resulting from harm (including the loss of
earnings or other benefits relating to employment, medical expense
loss, replacement services loss, loss due to death, burial cost, and loss
of business or employment opportunities) to the extent that recovery
56. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,275
(Dec. 21, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104).
57. See id. at 66,274.
58. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,235
(Mar. 13, 2002) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104).
59. See id. at 11,234 (increased non-economic damages for spouse and each de-
pendent from $50,000 to $100,000; expanded from twenty-four hour to seventy-two
hour time period for injured to have obtained medical treatment); see id. at 11,238
(used tables for adult males to calculate economic damages for all claimants).
60. See infra notes 297-318 and accompanying text.
61. Most of the financial calculations underlying these tables were performed by
Price Waterhouse, which had a "multimillion dollar contract" for services connected
with the Fund. Interview with Kenneth Feinberg, Special Master, September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 11, 2003).
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for such loss is allowed under applicable State law."62 The statute
defined "noneconomic losses" as "losses for physical and emotional
pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish,
disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and compan-
ionship, loss of consortium (other than loss of domestic service), he-
donic damages, injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary
losses of any kind or nature."63 Two items are of particular note here:
(1) the reference to "applicable State law" in connection with eco-
nomic (but not noneconomic) loss, and (2) the expansive definition of
noneconomic loss, which took in items such as hedonic damages and
other losses not universally recognized in wrongful death actions.6 4
Both of these items would be seized upon by those who claimed that
the Special Master's formulae failed to provide victims with the full
damages to which they were entitled under the Act.6 5
The regulations enlarging upon these definitions seemed to give
with one hand but take with the other. For example, the Special
Master indicated a willingness to deviate from the tables and adjust
compensation upwards in recognition of special needs. § 104.41 of the
regulations acknowledged that § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act required
the Special Master to take into consideration "the harm to the claim-
ant, the facts of the claim, and the individual circumstances of the
claimant," and stated that "the individual circumstances of the claim-
ant may include the financial needs or financial resources of the
claimant or the victim's dependents and beneficiaries."66 Other ele-
ments seem to indicate likely generous payouts. The same regulation
established a minimum payout (before deduction of collateral
sources) of $500,000 for deceased victims with a spouse or dependent,
or $300,000 for deceased victims who were single with no depen-
dents.67 (The Special Master's ultimate practice of setting the mini-
mum death award at $250,000, regardless of collateral sources, can
find no direct support in either the statute or the regulations.) And
collateral sources (which would be deducted from the final award)
62. ATSSSA § 402(7).
63. Id. at § 403(9).
64. See Lori A. Nicholson, Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death and Survival Ac-
tions: The Impact of Alzheimer's Disease, 2 ELDER L.J. 249, 259 n.88 (1994) (only Con-
necticut expressly allows post-death hedonic damages); Mather v. Griffin Hosp., 540
A.2d 666, 678 (Conn. 1988) (the Connecticut Supreme Court has "long held that loss
of life's enjoyments is compensable" in wrongful death cases).
65. See infra notes 126-154 and accompanying text.
66. 28 C.F.R. § 104.41 (2004).
67. Id.
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would be defined as narrowly as the statute would allow.68 But,
under § 104.42 the Special Master chose to interpret the phrase "to
the extent recovery for such loss is allowed under applicable state
law" (as used in the statute's definition of economic loss 6 9 ) as
preventing recovery "for those categories or types of economic losses
that would not be compensable under the law of the state that would
be applicable to any tort claims brought by or on behalf of the victim."
The statutory language would be interpreted as a limit, not as a man-
date; apparently the Special Master did not feel compelled to provide
full compensation for economic damages as provided under the rele-
vant state's tort law.
This interpretation was not an uninformed one. Reactions to the
Interim Final Rule included several comments critical of income-
based determinations that would create disparities between wealthy
and poor victims. 70 And Feinberg had, apparently, received advice
from both Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) (for whom he had pre-
viously worked) and Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) (with whom he
had become friendly while working on the Agent Orange case), which
he summarized as "Don't let twenty percent of the people get eighty
percent of the money."7 1 Somehow Feinberg would try to find a way
to navigate between the income-based determninations seemingly
mandated (but nowhere expressly required) by the statute and a de-
sire to moderate federal largess as to claimants who might otherwise
receive awards in excess of $10 million.
Under § 104.43 of the regulations, the Special Master would pub-
lish tables "that will permit prospective claimants to estimate deter-
minations of loss of earnings or other benefits related to employment
based upon the individual circumstances of the deceased victim, in-
cluding: the age of the decedent as of September 11, 2001; the num-
ber of dependents who survive the decedent; whether the decedent is
68. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47 excluded charitable gifts and tax benefits from collateral
sources subject to the statutory offset and allowed the Special Master to reduce the
offset attributable to insurance proceeds by the amount of premiums paid by the dece-
dent. Had charitable gifts been included in the definition of collateral sources, then
millions of dollars that Americans had donated to the many charities established to
help the September 11 victims would have become, in effect, contributions to the U.S.
Treasury. Both Ashcroft and Feinberg recognized that such a result was politically
and morally untenable, notwithstanding apparent congressional intent to include
charitable gifts in collateral sources subject to the offset. See BRILL, supra note 15, at
265-66.
69. Now codified as § 402(7).
70. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,237
(Mar. 13, 2002) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104).
71. Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 25, 2002, at 47.
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survived by a spouse; and the amount and nature of the decedent's
income for recent years."72 When those tables were published, in Au-
gust 2002, they topped out at $231,000 annual income, a figure sub-
stantially below that of some of the victims employed in the financial
industry that occupied much of the World Trade Center. Comments
published together with the Final Rule stated:
Although we still anticipate that awards in excess of $3 or $4
million will be rare, we emphasize again that there are no "caps"
under this program. To the contrary, each claimant has the op-
tion to ask for a hearing at which he or she may assert addi-
tional, individualized circumstances and argue that the
presumed award methodology is inadequate to resolve his or her
particular claim in a fair manner. We will consider all such in-
dividual circumstances, including, but not limited to, the finan-
cial needs of victims and victims' families.73
The Special Master thereby gave himself flexibility to depart
from his formulaic methodology where he felt circumstances
warranted.
All of this left survivors of the highest-income victims wondering
whether the awards would meet their expectations. Cantor Fitzger-
ald, a bond-trading firm that had lost several hundred employees
who had worked in the upper floors of the World Trade Center, pub-
lished a book detailing the economic losses to which the employees'
families were arguably entitled under New York law. 74 This book
served as a basis for a subsequent legal challenge to the regulations
and tables. 75
The disparity in treatment of high and low income victims under
the Fund's economic damages formula would be further tempered by
(1) the statutory requirement that awards be reduced by amounts
provided to victims from collateral sources, such as their own life in-
surance contracts, and (2) the Special Master's formula for presumed
awards of noneconomic damages. Treatment of collateral sources
under the Act was at variance with traditional tort rules. Congress's
insistence that collateral sources reduce payments from the Fund
may have reflected either (a) the recent tendency of legislatures to
72. 28 C.F.R. § 104.43 (2004).
73. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,234.
74. See Cantor Fitzgerald submission to the Department of Justice, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/cantor/cantor902smdojsub.pdf.
75. See infra notes 128-176 and accompanying text.
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look with disfavor on the collateral source rule76 and/or (b) recogni-
tion that the Fund was less a traditional means of tort recovery and
more a public benefit. If the Fund was more an expression of public
largess than an effort to mimic tort recovery, a reduction for collat-
eral sources could be seen as more or less benign, penalizing only
those who had other resources and leaving more funds available for
those less able to take care of themselves.
Rejecting the collateral source rule also could be seen as a way of
offsetting the advantage to the wealthy provided by the traditional
calculation of economic damages. High-wage earners were more
likely to have substantial life insurance policies and employee death
benefits to tide their families over. So the family of a high-wage
earner might see an initial economic damage calculation from the
Fund of several million dollars, only to find it reduced substantially
by life insurance proceeds also in the millions. That family's net
award from the Fund might be no greater than that of the family of a
more modest-wage earner; indeed, this was one of the complaints
about the Fund voiced by high-income families and their advocates. 77
But of course, in the end, the higher income family would end up with
a higher total recovery, some paid by the Fund, some through pro-
ceeds of an insurance policy it had purchased. In addition, the Spe-
cial Master's narrow definition of collateral sources (excluding, for
example, gifts from charities) 78 would have a salutary effect on fami-
lies of some moderate-income victims such as firefighters and police
officers. 79 There was probably some rough justice in this, enough to
76. See generally, Stephen L. Olson & Pat Wasson, Is the Collateral Source Rule
Applicable to Medicare and Medicaid Write-offs?, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 172, 173-74
(2004) (discussing how more than thirty states have passed legislation to modify or
abrogate the collateral source rule). For states abrogating collateral source rule in all
civil actions, see, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 9.17.070 (Michie 2000); MINN. STAT. § 548.36
(2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06 (2001). For states abrogating collateral source
rule in all personal injury actions, see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (1997);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52- 225a (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West 1994); IDAHO
CODE § 6-1606 (Michie 1998); IND. CODE § 34-44-1-2 (1998); IowA CODE § 668.14
(1998); MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.6303 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308 (2000);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97 (West 2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4545(c) (McKinney 2001).
77. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Many 9/11 Families Wait on Filing Suits, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 16, 2002, at Al.
78. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47.
79. See BRILL, supra note 15, at 650-51 (describing how one fireman's widow be-
came eligible to receive money from the federal public safety officer's benefit
($250,000), New York City one-year salary benefit ($52,000), New York State World
Trade Center Relief Fund ($20,000), Social Security ($370,000), Fire Department con-
tractual death benefit ($25,000), Victim Compensation Fund (est. $1,530,000), Union
life insurance (est. $175,000), accidental death coverage ($50,000), Fire Department
group insurance ($8,500), pension ($2,400,000 over 40 years), Firefighters' 9/11 Fund
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displease people at both ends of the economic spectrum in equal
amounts.
The regulations regarding noneconomic losses would attempt to
transform an amorphous, elusive concept into a coherent formula.80
Presumed noneconomic losses for those killed in the attacks would be
in the amount of $250,000. This amount, said Feinberg, was "roughly
equivalent to the amounts received under existing federal programs
by safety officers who are killed on duty, or members of the military
who are killed in the line of duty while serving our nation."81 Under
the Interim Final Rule, there would be an additional $50,000 for the
spouse and each dependent of the victim; under the Final Rule that
amount was increased to $100,000.82 With respect to noneconomic
awards, the Special Master was disinclined to differentiate between
those on board the four aircraft that were seized by the terrorists and
those inside the buildings struck by three of those aircraft; between
those trapped above the fires and those below them; between those
who had engaged in desperate cell phone conversations with their
families and those who did not have the opportunity to exchange final
words with their loved ones. Feinberg wished to spare claimants the
agony of producing evidence of the suffering they and their loved ones
had endured on September 11th. Again, however, claimants would
be allowed to present evidence of special circumstances entitling
them to a larger award.8 3
The regulations regarding noneconomic loss, while formulaic,
had the communitarian benefit of treating everyone more-or-less
equally. Office workers and flight attendants, firefighters and bond
traders all would be presumed to have suffered equally, or perhaps
($418,000), Twin Towers Fund ($355,000), Red Cross (average payout of $121,000),
New York Police and Fire Widow's and Children's Benefit Fund ($118,000), Robin
Hood Fund ($5,000), September 11th Fund (average payout of $20,000), Leary
Firefighters Foundation ($3,500), Union Widows and Children's Fund ($128,000),
New York Stock Exchange Fallen Heroes Fund ($20,000), and New York Fire Safety
Foundation Fund ($7,000) for a total of $6,076,000). A Rand Institute for Civil Justice
study found that "[tihe large charitable gifts combined with other government bene-
fits not available to civilians meant that [the survivors of] an emergency responder
killed in the attack likely received $1.1 million more than [the survivors oil a civilian
with a similar economic loss." LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, COMPENSA-
TION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS xxv (2004).
80. See COCHRAN & ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 206. See also Roselle L. Wissler
et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and
Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 754-55 (1999).
81. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,279
(Nov. 5, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104).
82. 28 C.F.R. § 104.44.
83. See id. at § 104.33(b).
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more accurately, all of their survivors would be presumed to be
equally deserving of recovery for this element of loss. To some, how-
ever, this was the problem. Some families thought that they or their
loved ones had suffered more than others. Others thought that the
reduction of this suffering to a formula (and a "mere" $250,000 per
decedent plus $100,000 per dependent) was an insult to the memory
of their murdered relatives.8 4 Some victims' families seemed to fault
the Special Master for failing to arrive at a figure that could actually
represent the monumental loss they had suffered,8 5 despite his ac-
knowledgment that "[n]o amount of money can right the horrific
wrongs done on September 11, 2001."s 6 Realistically, the best he
could do was offer a sum that would ease the families' economic hard-
ship and serve as a token of the nation's heartfelt sympathy.
2. The Downstream Claims Process
Procedurally, the regulations allowed claimants to choose one of
two tracks for consideration of their claims. If a claimant chose Track
A, a Claims Evaluator would determine eligibility and the claimant's
presumed award in accordance with the regulations within 45 days of
filing; thereafter the claimant could either accept the award or re-
quest a hearing before the Special Master or his designee.8 7 Under
Track B, the Claims Evaluator would determine eligibility (again
within 45 days); thereafter, eligible claimants would proceed directly
to hearing88
28 C.F.R. § 104.33 spelled out the procedures to be used at the
hearing. Consistent with the statute, claimants could be represented
by counsel, present evidence (orally or in writing), and present wit-
nesses (including experts); the Special Master or his designee would
be permitted to question witnesses.8 9 In short, "[t]he objective of
hearings shall be to permit the claimant to present information or
evidence that the claimant believes is necessary to a full understand-
ing of the claim." 90 Hearings would, "to the extent practicable, be
scheduled at times and in locations convenient to the claimant or his
84. See Belkin, supra note 13; BRILL, supra note 15, at 314; Hensler, supra note 5,
at 249-52.
85. See Hensler, supra note 5, at 249-52.
86. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,233.
87. 28 C.F.R. § 104.31.
88. Id.
89. Id. at § 104.33(b),(d).
90. Id. at § 104.33(b).
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or her representative" and "limited in length to a time period deter-
mined by the Special Master or his designee." 91 The Special Master
was required to notify the claimant in writing of the amount of the
award, but was not obliged to "create or provide any written record of
the deliberations that resulted in that determination."92 Again, con-
sistent with the statute, there would be "no further review or appeal
of the Special Master's determination."93 The process was designed
to take no more than 120 days, consistent with § 405(b)(3) of the Act.
The process would thereby resemble that which is used in final,
binding arbitration, except that there would be no party opposing the
claim. It featured flexibility, ease-of-use (although some would be
daunted by the thirty-three-page claims form), and quick turn-
around. A procedure was established under the regulations to pro-
vide advance benefits to survivors and injured claimants to alleviate
financial hardship.94 The Special Master established a website 95 and
several Claim Assistance sites to help guide claimants through the
process; ATLA established Trial Lawyers Care, through which ex-
perienced trial lawyers would provide free legal assistance to people
making claims on the Fund. (Many claimants nevertheless availed
themselves of lawyers charging fees, which were sometimes below
the normal billing rate.)
Media commentators described the scheme for the Fund as
"about as fair as it could possibly be," 96 "a good start on the road to
recovery," 97 "eminently fair,"98 and "offer[ing] speedy and rational
compensation." 99 But storm clouds were forming.
III. A TORRENT OF CRITICISM, OR, No GOOD DEED
GOES UNPUNISHED
Even as many observers applauded the establishment of the
Fund and the principles under which it was to operate, opposition
was forming. Some of the criticism involved objections to the Fund's
basic statutory structure: the failure to include victims of other ter-
rorist attacks (such as the 1995 bombing of the Alfred B. Murrah
91. 28 C.F.R. § 104.33 (c).
92. Id. at § 104.33(g).
93. Id.
94. Id. at § 104.22.
95. http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/
96. Steven Brill, A Tragic Calculus, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 2001, at 28.
97. A Fair Shake for Victims, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, § 4, at 8.
98. A Fair Amount, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 28, 2001, at 46, available at 2001 WL
32181395.
99. Take the Money, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2002, at A24.
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Federal Building in Oklahoma City) or even a broader range of disas-
ters; the failure to include a broader range of victims of the Septem-
ber 11th attacks (such as those who suffered from the inhalation of
toxic substances in the weeks following the attacks100 ); and the in-
come-based differentiation among awards to be granted to the vic-
tims and their families. Other criticism involved the regulatory
scheme: the delegation of broad discretion to the Special Master; the
Special Master's alleged failure to follow the statutory mandate in his
regulations and tables setting forth presumed awards; and the ab-
sence of any appeals apparatus or the requirement of a written opin-
ion that could provide the reasoning behind the award or form the
basis for an appeal. Most of the objections to the Fund stemmed from
procedural and substantive aspects of the scheme that deviated from
normal expectations regarding tort recovery. We will consider some
of these criticisms here, not so much to provide a catalog of objections
regarding the Fund as to consider the Fund's implications for admin-
istrative regulation, tort reform, and dispute resolution.
A. Statutory "Flaws"
One set of critiques of the Fund can be categorized as objections
to the basis for compensation set forth in the statute. There were two
major subsets to this category: (1) that the Fund did not embrace a
broad enough class of victims; and (2) that the Fund allocated a dis-
proportionate amount of awards to the families of high-income
victims.
1. No Awards to Persons Not Physically Injured in the
September 11th Attacks or Their Immediate
Aftermath
This criticism of the Fund's structure in turn has two subcatego-
ries. One of these involves the Fund's failure to provide any remedy
for victims of other terrorist attacks, or, for that matter, tragedies
unrelated to terrorism. The Special Master has described them in
this manner:
I'll show you e-mails from people that'll break your heart. ...
Dear Mr. Feinberg, my son died in Oklahoma City. Why not
me? Dear Mr. Feinberg, my son died in the first World Trade
Center bombing, in '93, why not me? Anthrax - why not me?
African Embassy bombing - why not me? U.S.S. Cole - why not
100. See Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the Context of September
11, 88 VA. L. REV. 1831, 1849 (2002).
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me? And then you get even beyond terrorism. "My husband
died last year saving three little girls in a Mississippi flood -
why not him?". . . Where do you stop?1° 1
These questions, coming from ordinary citizens who have exper-
ienced extraordinary tragedies, carry a special poignancy and bear a
significant truth.'0 2 It is difficult to distinguish, in principle, those
who have suffered from the September 11th tragedy and those who
have borne the scars of other terrorist attacks on the United States.
It is but a small (and some would say irrelevant) step to others who
have died in a tragic, premature manner. For the Special Master, the
answer can be couched in straightforward legal terms: Congress did
not give him the power to make awards to those who were not di-
rectly involved in the September 11th tragedy. However, that does
not answer why Congress chose to limit recovery in this manner.
Why did other terrorist attacks generate horror and sympathy,
but not federal government largess in the form or scale allotted to the
September 1 1th victims? I suggest several reasons, grounded in gen-
uine compassion, patriotic fervor, and practical politics.
First (as I have observed elsewhere), "the September 11 attacks
resulted in deaths and injuries on what was for Americans an un-
precedented scale-a monumental scale, accentuated by the indelible
televised image of the collapse of two 110-story skyscrapers .... It
would take extraordinary measures (of which the Fund was but one)
to redress this unprecedented scar on the national psyche.' 0 3 Sec-
ond, the visibility of the events of September 11th distinguished it
from most tortious conduct, and even most acts of terrorism. The
September 11th victims were not the cloying, overreaching demons
portrayed in the tort reform crusades, people who, with the assis-
tance of tasseled-loafered trial lawyers, had played the system to
pluck the purses of hard-working Americans and productive corpora-
tions.' 0 4 Unlike those imagined hordes of whiners and malingerers,
101. Kolbert, supra note 71, at 42, 49
102. A number of comments received from the public at large suggested not that
victims of other misfortunes should have access to the Fund, but rather that the Sep-
tember l1th victims should be denied compensation. Hensler, supra note 5, at 444.
103. COCHRAN & ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 192.
104. The contrast between the Bush Administration's support for the Fund and its
ongoing efforts to limit tort recoveries in other circumstances (such as medical mal-
practice) demonstrates the difference between the treatment of abstract concepts and
visible tragedies. The $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages proposed by the Bush
Administration for medical malpractice cases equals the $250,000 in presumed
noneconomic damages provided by the Fund to families of September 11 decedents.
To this $250,000 the Special Master would add $100,000 per dependent. See Help
Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act, H.R. 5, 108th
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the September I1th victims were visible; they were real people with
real injuries. We had seen it on television and shared their pain, and
Congress, in the episodic, issue-of-the-moment manner of most legis-
latures, responded. Third,
the shared national trauma came in the form of a foreign attack
on the community of the United States of America. Those who
perished in the World Trade Center, in the Pentagon, and on
Flight 93 were believed to have died on behalf of all Americans,
creating a justifiable, communitarian sense that the loss should
not fall disproportionately on those who were unfortunate
enough to occupy the targets at the fatal moment. There was
little Americans could do as a nation to ameliorate the personal
suffering; the nation could, however, make a large financial ges-
ture to convey its sympathy and ease the financial trauma. 10 5
But the most significant distinction between this event and its
predecessors was the legislative context in which the Victim Compen-
sation Fund was established. The legislation creating the Fund was
but a part of a larger measure, the Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act. As explained earlier, Washington recog-
nized the need for federal legislation protecting the airline industry
before it recognized the need for a comprehensive compensation
scheme for the families of those killed and injured in the September
11th attacks. The Victim Compensation Fund pivoted around two
statutory provisions: (1) the preclusion of a conventional tort action
(against airlines and others) for those who sought compensation from
the Fund;10 6 and (2) the limiting of the airlines' liability to those who
chose to sue (rather than seek compensation from the Fund) to the
airlines' liability insurance coverage. 10 7 While it was clear that Al
Qaeda terrorists were chiefly responsible for the attacks, the danger
that allegations of security lapses would prompt lawsuits against air-
lines and others was cogent enough and the concern that the airlines
would be deemed uninsurable (and would thereby fail economically)
was potent enough to cause Congress to provide for victim compensa-
tion in the airline bailout package. The Victim Compensation Fund
must therefore be seen as a component of a larger measure to protect
a vital industry from failure. "Unfortunately for the victims of the
Oklahoma City bombing or other disasters, no major industry was in
Cong. § 4(b) (2003). See also Ceci Connolly, Cheney Urges Cap on Medical Malprac-
tice Awards, Proposal Aims to Improve Health Care, WASH. POST, July 20, 2004, at A6.
105. COCHRAN & ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 192.
106. ATSSSA § 405(3)(B)(i).
107. Id. at § 408(a)(1).
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danger of failure as a consequence of lawsuits the victims or their
families might bring. 108
And so the federal government responded to private harm, but
harm on a scale so massive that only the federal government could
address it; harm that, if left unrecompensed, would have done further
damage to the general public. Even those espousing limited govern-
ment (such as the President and many members of Congress) deemed
the circumstances appropriate for federal intervention. 10 9
The second criticism regarding the breadth of the Fund's cover-
age involves its failure to compensate victims of the September 11th
attacks who were not killed or injured within hours of the four air-
plane crashes. Some people (including several who were involved in
rescue and cleanup operations) complained of illnesses contracted
due to inhalation of toxic particles in the vicinity of the World Trade
Center (which came to be known as "Ground Zero") during the weeks
following September 11th. Others (particularly businesses near
Ground Zero) had suffered substantial economic losses. Statutorily,
relief from the Fund was limited to those who were "present at the
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, or the site of the airline crash at
Shanksville, Pennsylvania at the time, or in the immediate after-
math, of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001,"
and "had suffered physical harm or death as a result of such an air
crash," crew members and passengers (excluding the terrorists) on
any of the four airplanes involved in that day's crashes, and the per-
sonal representatives of any deceased victims meeting the foregoing
description. 110 The regulations defined "immediate aftermath" (for
all claimants other than rescue workers) as "the period of time from
the crashes until twelve hours after the crashes;" for rescue workers,
that period was extended to ninety-six hours.1 1' "Physical harm"
(apart from harm resulting in death) was limited, for the most part,
to a physical injury treated by a medical professional within twenty-
four hours after injury or rescue. 112
Thus, for example, most persons who had sustained respiratory
damage due to exposure to toxic dust in the weeks following the col-
lapse of the World Trade Center were precluded from recovering
108. COCHRAN & ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 194.
109. During floor debates of recent appropriations measures Congress has given
further indication that a philosophy of limited government often gives way to political
expedience. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. H4898 (daily ed., Jun. 24, 2004) (statement by
Rep. Hensarling).
110. ATSSSA § 405(c)(2).
111. 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(b).
112. Id. at § 104.2(c).
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through the Fund. 113 Again, it would be difficult, as a matter of prin-
ciple, to distinguish these victims from those who had suffered more
immediate non-fatal injuries. Perhaps they were considered too far
removed in time from the cataclysmic event to register on the na-
tion's (or Congress') conscience, or too far removed from the events on
the hijacked airplanes to be viewed as a significant threat to the air-
lines' assets through suit.1 4 Ironically, these victims, while pre-
cluded from recovery through the Fund, were still subject to the
limitations on tort recovery set forth in § 408 of the Act. (Section
408(a)(3), limiting the liability of New York City, was enacted as an
amendment to the Act with these toxic inhalation claims in mind.11 5)
These victims, lacking the recourse of Fund claimants, would seem-
ingly be in the best position, legally and strategically, to mount a con-
stitutional challenge to those limitations. 116
2. Larger Awards to Rich People
As for those who were eligible for the Fund's assistance, concern
was expressed regarding the disparities in likely awards to dece-
dents' families based on the victims' prospective income streams. The
income-based disparity in awards for economic loss would come as no
surprise to those who used the traditional tort system as their tem-
plate; for them, the chief problem was the possibility that the Fund
113. For a much fuller exposition of this issue, see Robert Rabin, supra note 100,
at 1843-53.
114. For purposes of proximate cause, passengers on the four hijacked airliners
would be seen as having had the most direct connection to the airlines, occupants of
the World Trade Center and Pentagon as having had a less direct connection, and
those exposed to toxic dust in the vicinity of the World Trade Center as having had an
even less direct connection to any culpable acts on the part of the airlines or airport
security companies. The proximity of the harm to the wrongdoing (assuming, for the
moment, that there was any wrongdoing on the part of the airlines) bears a resem-
blance (albeit on a much larger scale) to the helpful, though timeworn, hypothetical
provided in Judge William Andrews' famous dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail-
road Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 353 (1928), the seminal and most well-known of the line of
New York proximate cause cases. (In the hypothetical, a driver collides with another
car loaded with dynamite in the trunk. In the ensuing explosion "A, walking on the
sidewalk nearby, is killed. B, sitting in a window of a building opposite, is cut by
flying glass. C, likewise sitting in a window a block away, is similarly injured." Mean-
while, the explosion startles a woman ten blocks away and she involuntarily drops
her baby.) But the toxic dust victim might have a broader choice of defendants as
distinguished from an occupant of the World Trade Center, she could sue both United
and American Airlines, the security subcontractors for both airlines, the City of New
York (for failure to protect or warn against toxic dust), and perhaps others. The pros-
pects for such suits would be uncertain; all would be subject to limitations as to liabil-
ity and venue found in § 408 of the ATSSSA.
115. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 579-80.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 202-211.
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might fail to provide compensation identical to that which the tort
system would provide for a successful claimant. 117 But those who
"viewed the program not as a replication of the tort system, but in-
stead as a government program designed to assist the victims and
their families,"118 considered it unfair that families of the wealthiest
victims would receive more money than those of the brave police of-
ficers and firefighters who had rushed into the doomed buildings to
rescue them. "Rich people do not deserve more because they are
rich," observed one commenter on the regulations.1 9 The notion that
economic distinctions would survive the deaths of those involved in a
common disaster seemed perverse to some, especially those unfamil-
iar with the manner in which the tort system allocates damages.
The problem was based, at least in part, on the competing theo-
ries of corrective and distributive justice. Traditional tort remedies
are based on a corrective justice paradigm: defendants are held lia-
ble on the basis of fault, classified as either intentional or negligent
wrongdoing, and damages are designed to place the plaintiff in the
same position she would have been in absent the defendant's tortious
conduct. So a high-income victim, deprived of that income through
death or disabling injury, generates a larger damage award than a
lower-income victim suffering from the identical injuries. Even strict
liability, which departs from the corrective justice model of liability
and embraces distributive justice principles, 120 allows damages
based on traditional corrective justice principles. 121
117. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,237
(Mar. 13, 2002) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104); see also infra notes 124-51 and
accompanying text.
118. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. at
11,237; see also Kolbert, supra note 71, and accompanying text.
119. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,237.
See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
120. By distributive justice, I refer to the fairness of the outcomes or rewards that
an individual or group receives. See C. Wesley Younts & Charles W. Mueller, Justice
Processes: Specifying the Mediating Role of Perceptions of Distributive Justice, 66 Am.
Soc. REV. 125, 125 (2001). Social psychologists often use the term "distributive jus-
tice" in a broader sense "to refer to psychological reactions to the outcome of a dispute
or an allocation." E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCE-
DURAL JUSTICE 62 (1988).
121. Initially, at least, the courts adopting strict products liability embraced dis-
tributive justice concepts, i.e., the idea that defendant manufacturers should be held
liable not due to any fault on their part, but due to their ability to distribute the costs
of product-related injuries through the pricing mechanism. See, e.g., Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944). This concept has been eroded of late, as fault-
based principles have resurfaced in products liability cases. See Sheila L. Birnbaum,
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But corrective justice was not the rationale behind a program in
which the United States Treasury would be the source for payment of
billions of dollars to the September 11th victims and their families.
Recovery from the Fund was to be based not on any wrongdoing by
the United States government, 122 but on humanitarian instincts
grounded in distributive justice, i.e., a desire to avoid financial dislo-
cation on the part of victims and their families, and to express a sense
of shared national loss. True, the Fund was intended as an attractive
alternative to a tort remedy based on corrective justice, but that in
itself did not require that taxpayer-funded payments be based on a
corrective justice concept. Having abandoned fault as a basis for re-
covery, there was no theoretical basis for maintaining a corrective
justice model for damages.
Corrective justice in the traditional tort sense remains an appro-
priate remedy against the Al Qaeda terrorists or, for that matter,
against far less culpable but arguably negligent parties such as the
airlines and airport security firms. Amendments to the ATSSSA per-
mit the families of victims to bring tort claims "against any person
who is a knowing participant in any conspiracy to hijack any aircraft
or commit any terrorist act,"123 without forfeiting their claims
against the Victim Compensation Fund. Those who were willing to
forego a claim on the Fund could test their chances in an action
against an allegedly negligent airline or security firm under § 408 of
the Act. However, the federal government, which played no direct
role in bringing about the September 11th tragedy, had no legal obli-
gation to provide compensation to families in accordance with the tort
law's notions of corrective justice. 124
Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence to Strict Liability to Negli-
gence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD.
LiB. § 2(b) (1997). Perhaps a more complete example of a distributive justice-based
deviation from the tort system is worker's compensation, a no-fault remedy in which
the injured worker receives limited compensation, based on a published schedule
rather than on an individualized determination of actual loss. See, e.g., N.Y.
WORKER'S COMP. LAw § 29 (McKinney 2004).
122. At least a few commentators have suggested that the Fund's establishment
implied that the government "was responsible in some way for failing to prevent the
tragedy." Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 5, at 359. The legislative history is devoid
of any such characterization.
123. ATSSSA § 408(c).
124. But see THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 263-66 (2004) (indicating missed opportunities by
the federal government to prevent the September l1th tragedy). The federal govern-
ment's negligence, if any, would likely fall under the discretionary function exception
of the Federal Torts Claims Act. See Marshall Shapo, Compensation for Victims of
Terror: A Specialized Jurisprudence of Injury, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2001).
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The Cantor Fitzgerald bond-trading firm (which employed many
of the World Trade Center victims) would complain that the Special
Master's tables inadequately provided for awards to families of many
of its high-income employees. 125 This was understandable advocacy
by Cantor Fitzgerald on behalf of its extended "family." But Cantor
Fitzgerald's cause need not be taken up by the federal government.
In its haste to rescue the airlines and provide compensation to the
families of September 11th victims, Congress reflexively drew on
remedies language from the familiar tort system. It was under no
obligation to do so. 12 6 Congress squandered an opportunity to re-
place a corrective justice system designed to punish wrongdoers and
compensate victims for lost economic expectations (however uneven)
with a distributive justice model designed to more equitably provide
for the victims' families and demonstrate the compassion of the
American people. 127 To be sure, there are reasonable explanations
for this. The time was short, and there was a practical need to devise
a system that would be regarded as a palatable substitute for suing
the airlines. But it is unlikely that a dollar-for-dollar replication of
traditional tort damages would have been necessary to deter specula-
tive claims against airlines and security firms teetering on the edge
of bankruptcy.
What occurred in the frenzy of legislative drafting and the mael-
strom of post-September 11th events was a default to familiar lan-
guage. To the extent it was given any thought at all, a tort-based
damages formula was a capitulation to the routine, rather than an
embrace of something new and imaginative to address an unprece-
dented challenge. In providing no-fault recourse to the U.S. Trea-
sury, Congress broke half the mold; in defaulting to traditional tort
definitions of loss, it preserved the other half. Might a Congress and
administration that was a little more imaginative and a little less
pressed for time have developed a still generous but more egalitarian
means of distributing funds representing the nation's largess? Might
it have found statutory language to explicitly provide compensation
on a needs basis? Under the circumstances, one can hardly fault the
Special Master for finding the statutory wiggle-room to flatten out
125. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
126. COCHRAN & ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 202.
127. In his Final Report, the Special Master observed, "The statutory mandate of
tailored awards fueled divisiveness among claimants and undercut the very cohesion
and united national response reflected in the Act." Final Report of the Special Master
for the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 82 at http://www.usdoj.
gov/final-report.pdf.
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economic awards at the top, to take individual needs into account,
and to award noneconomic damages on an egalitarian basis.
B. Administrative Law Issues
But these adjustments on the part of the Special Master in turn
spawned more vocal criticism, in the form of complaints that the re-
sulting scheme would fail to fully compensate some victims in accor-
dance with the statutory mandate. Particularly harsh criticism came
from the Cantor Fitzgerald bond-trading firm. The data compiled by
that firm supported the contention that, based on his formulae and
tables, the Special Master planned to provide compensation to the
families of high-income victims far short of that of which was man-
dated under the enabling legislation. On January 24, 2003, the fami-
lies of six victims (most of whom had been Cantor Fitzgerald
employees) filed suit against the Special Master, the Attorney Gen-
eral and the United States Department of Justice, seeking class certi-
fication and declaratory and injunctive relief to the effect that the
awards contemplated by the Special Master were in violation of the
underlying legislation. The complaint in that action, Colaio v. Fein-
berg,128 together with two other actions with which it was consoli-
dated, provided a litany of arguments in support of the proposition
that the compensation scheme was inadequate and at odds with the
statute. It is worth pausing to examine these arguments, as well as
the judicial response.
1. Conformity of Regulations to Statutory Mandate
The plaintiffs in Colaio contended that the Special Master's com-
pensation scheme (1) imposed an arbitrary and unreasonable "cap"
on awards; (2) improperly imposed a "needs" test in determining the
"individual circumstances of the claimant;" (3) imposed a restrictive
interpretation of "economic loss" contrary to New York law; (4) im-
properly failed to publish methodology for determining presumed eco-
nomic loss beyond the 98th percentile of income and focused on 1998-
2000 salary levels; (5) required that claimants present "extraordinary
circumstances" for claims not adequately addressed by the presump-
tive award methodology; (6) improperly used post-tax income as the
basis for calculating economic loss; (7) arbitrarily and unreasonably
used a higher consumption rate for single decedents than for those
who were married or had children in determining economic loss; and
128. 262 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Class Action Complaint, Colaio
v. Feinberg, 03 Civ. 0558 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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(8) violated equal protection and due process rights in making award
determinations. 129
On consideration of cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge
Alvin K. Hellerstein employed the standards of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def Council1 30 and Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 131 to de-
termine whether the Special Master's regulations and policies were
in accord with the statutory mandate. Under Chevron, the courts ap-
ply a two-step analysis of agency regulations: (1) if Congress "has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue" in the text of the stat-
ute, the text governs; and (2) if the statute is "silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue," then the court reviews "whether
the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."1 32 Under Skidmore, agency policies not promulgated in ac-
cordance with the APA's notice and comment procedures (here, that
would include the Special Master's tables) are still accorded a mea-
sure of deference. 133 Judge Hellerstein decided that "[tIhe Special
Master's policies qualify for Chevron deference or, at minimum, Skid-
more respect."'134 The challenge to the regulations and methodologies
governing the Fund thereby brought the personal injury claims of
September 11th victims and their families into the arcane world of
administrative law.
Employing the Chevron and Skidmore standards, Judge Heller-
stein examined each of the plaintiffs' contentions. He found "no relia-
ble evidence that the Special Master ha[d] imposed a cap."1 3 5 While
129. Colaio, 262 F. Supp 2d at 282-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Class Action Com-
plaint 18-28, Colaio v. Feinberg, 03 Civ. 0558, (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
130. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
131. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
132. Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (paraphrasing Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). The Colaio court did not distinguish
between the two standards employed under the second step of the Chevron analysis,
i.e., whether Congress had expressly delegated rule-making authority with respect to
the issue in question. Because the distinction between "arbitrary and capricious" and
"unreasonable" is a fine line indeed, it is questionable as to whether such a distinction
is useful or necessary.
133. "The weight of [the agency's] judgment in a particular case will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consis-
tency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power
to persuade, if lacking power to control." Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 288 (quoting
Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 135, 140 (1944)). This deference is justified by the "spe-
cialized experience and broader investigations and information available to the
agency, and given the value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial under-
standings of what a national law requires." Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 288, quoting
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001).
134. Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 289.
135. Id. at 290.
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acknowledging Feinberg's statement that "awards in excess of $3 or
$4 million will be rare," the Judge recognized that each claimant had
a right to a hearing "at which he or she may assert additional individ-
ualized circumstances and argue that the presumed award methodol-
ogy is inadequate."136 Judge Hellerstein also noted that the Fund's
website already had indicated awards in excess of $3 million.137
(Awards for deceased victims ultimately topped out at $7.1 mil-
lion.1 38 ) Later in the opinion, the court recognized the Special
Master's observation that "calculation of awards for many victims
with extraordinary incomes beyond the 98th percentile could be a
highly speculative exercise;" 139 even the plaintiffs had conceded that
one may more readily forecast future income streams for low- and
middle-income employees than for decedents with high incomes.1 40
The regulations were therefore reasonable in declining to calculate
presumed economic loss beyond the 98th percentile, leaving the issue
to hearings and fact-finding.' 41 Likewise, it was not unreasonable to
use a three-year earnings average to determine presumed economic
lOSS. 1 4 2
As to the use of a "needs" test, the judge determined that "[tihe
agency's definition of 'individual circumstances' to 'include the finan-
cial needs or financial resources of the claimant or the victim's depen-
dents and beneficiaries,' 28 C.F.R. § 104.41, is a plausible and
reasonable construction of the phrase and does not conflict with any
expressed congressional intent."1 43 While the Colaio complaint cited
Representative Spratt's concern that the statute called for disparate
treatment of high and low wage-earners, 44 the court looked to the
Senate for its legislative history, quoting (among others) remarks by
Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.):
No amount of money can begin to compensate the victims for
their suffering. Nothing will make them and their families
"whole." It is not the intent of the federal Fund to do this. Nor
136. Id. at 289-90, citing September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67
Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,234 (Mar. 13, 2002) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104).
137. Id. at 290.
138. http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments-deceased.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 19, 2004).
139. Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 295, quoting September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,233, 11,237.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 296.
142. Id. at 291-92.
143. Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 296.
144. See id. at 290; See also supra text accompanying note 40.
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is it the intent of the Fund to duplicate the arbitrary, wildly di-
vergent awards that sometimes come from our deeply flawed
tort system-awards from which up to one third or more of the
victims' award is often taken by attorneys.
The intent of the Fund is to ensure that the victims of this un-
precedented, unforeseeable, and horrific event, and their fami-
lies do not suffer financial hardship in addition to the terrible
hardships they already have been forced to endure. 14 5
The court further quoted Senator McCain's observations regard-
ing the possibility that a conventional tort action might not yield
favorable results for the victims and their families, concluding that
"[tihe Fund was not intended to replicate tort damage awards in
wrongful death cases. 1 4 6 Despite the absence of any reference to the
98th percentile level in the statute, the court stated that the "discre-
tion beyond the 98th percentile level to determine awards according
to the claimant's needs, resources, and other individual circum-
stances" was "discretion that Congress wanted the Special Master to
have.' 4 7 Furthermore, the failure to furnish presumptive award
guidelines for those with annual incomes above the 98th percentile
did not, in the court's eyes, create an equal protection claim. Classifi-
cations based upon wealth alone are not suspect, and the Special
Master's methodology was rationally related to a legitimate govern-
mental interest, i.e., providing a speedy and just system of making
awards.148 Finally, the plaintiffs' due process contention was seen as
recasting an invalid statutory claim as a constitutional argument.149
Of particular significance is the court's treatment of the Special
Master's interpretation of the phrase "to the extent recovery for such
loss is allowed under applicable State law" (in the statute's definition
of "economic loss"' 5 0 ) as imposing a limitation, rather than a man-
date, as to recovery for economic loss.15 The court noted that the
text of § 402(7) refers to the categories of loss, and does not deal with
the calculation of damages. It further noted that § 402(7) was a defi-
nitions section; statutory guidance for the calculation of awards was
to be found elsewhere, in § 405(b). But § 405(b) employed the term
145. Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 291 (quoting 147 CONG. REC. S9594 (daily ed. Sept.
21, 2001) (statement of Sen. McCain)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 293.
148. Id. at 300.
149. Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 300-01.
150. ATSSSA §402(7).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
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"economic loss"- defined in § 402(7) - in describing how the harm to
the claimant was to be determined. Nevertheless, said the court,
"Congress did not instruct the Special Master to engage in the intri-
cate calculations mandated by state tort law in crafting awards."'152
The text of § 402(7) was ambiguous, the government's reading was
"based on a permissible reading of the statute," and the court there-
fore accorded deference to the agency interpretation under Chev-
ron. 153 In like manner, given that the Special Master was not bound
to follow state law in determining the amount of loss, his use of after-
tax earnings to determine economic loss was entitled to deference,
and was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 15 4 And the
use of higher consumption rates for single victims was also seen as
"rationally based and reasonably and properly implement[ing] the
Act and regulations.' 155
2. The Nondelegation Issue
Prior to the above analysis, the court addressed two additional
administrative law issues that the plaintiffs had raised: (1) that Con-
gress did not delegate to the Special Master the power to prescribe
the standards by which the awards are determined, and left it to the
Special Master only to calculate awards according to criteria defined
by Congress; and (2) that if Congress did delegate discretion to the
Special Master, such delegation was not guided by any "intelligible
principle."
The court made short shrift of the first issue, citing language in
the statute expressly authorizing the Special Master to "promulgate
all procedural and substantive rules for the administration of this ti-
tle."1 56 The second issue involved a "nondelegation" argument, the
assertion that a Congressional delegation of lawmaking power to an
administrative agency presents a separation of powers issue, and
152. Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 294.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 298. Note that by finding that the Special Master's methodology was
"not arbitrary and capricious, and is reasonable," id., Judge Hellerstein obviated the
need to determine whether Congress had expressly instructed the Special Master to
resolve the issue at hand. In fact, Congress' instructions to the Attorney General (and
through him, the Special Master) were fairly general, but could be viewed as embrac-
ing regulations of this type.
155. Id. at 299.
156. Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 289, quoting ATSSSA § 404(a)(2).
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that Congress must provide the agency with an "intelligible princi-
ple" to which the agency is directed to conform.- 57 The issue may be
seen as a sleeping giant. It is sleeping because it has been employed
only twice to invalidate a statutory delegation of lawmaking power,
the last instance being the notorious Schechter Poultry case.158 The
issue is a giant one because it challenges the lawmaking power of
administrative agencies, exercised since the creation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission in 1887, and greatly expanded since the ad-
vent of the New Deal in the 1930s. At least one member of the cur-
rent Supreme Court, Justice Clarence Thomas, sees no reason to
condition application of the nondelegation doctrine on the existence of
an "intelligible principle" to guide administrative agencies, as no
such language appears in the Constitution.15 9 In Whitman v. Ameri-
can Trucking Associations, Inc., Justice Thomas invited the Court
"[oln a future day" to "address the question whether our delegation
jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders' understanding
of separation of powers. '1 60 Were this more restrictive view of ad-
ministrative lawmaking to prevail, the entire system of administra-
tive governance might be shaken at its foundation.
Judge Hellerstein was not so bold as to shake this system at the
district court level. Instead, he found an intelligible principle in
§ 403's statement that the Act's purpose is to "provide compensation"
and in § 405(b)'s provision of basic criteria for determining the
amount of the award - the harm to the claimant, the facts of the
claim, and the individual circumstances of the claimant. The court
also noted that it was not necessary "that Congress supply adminis-
trative officials with a specific formula for guidance in a field where
flexibility and the adaption of congressional policy to infinitely varia-
ble conditions constitute the essence of the program."' 61 The court
concluded: "Although plaintiffs may disagree with how the Special
157. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457
(2001).
158. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invali-
dating § 3 of National Industrial Recovery Act). The other instance was Panama Re-
fining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating § 9(c) of National Industrial
Recovery Act). These cases were critically viewed as judicial efforts to thwart the
New Deal, giving rise to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. See
generally ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941); MAR-
IAN C. McKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR (2002).
159. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 486-87, (Thomas, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 487.
161. Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 287, quoting Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742
(1948).
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Master proposes to exercise his discretion, and perhaps even with
Congress' decision to grant him discretion, it cannot be said that the
Act fails to provide an 'intelligible principle' by which the Special
Master shall determine the compensation to be awarded. 1 62
3. Between the Rock of Nondelegation and the Hard Place of
Chevron
While inconsistent pleading is not unknown under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 163 the Colaio plaintiffs' two delegation argu-
ments seem to defeat one another. If the statute set forth sufficient
criteria for the Special Master to calculate awards without additional
rules (as the Colaio plaintiffs contended), then certainly whatever
discretion Congress gave the Special Master was guided by an intelli-
gible principle; and if an intelligible principle was lacking, then Con-
gress gave the Special Master insufficient guidance to calculate
awards unaided by regulations. But juxtaposition of the nondelega-
tion and Chevron ISkidmore issues presented a similar paradox for
the Fund's defenders. In order for the statute to survive the nondele-
gation argument, Congress had to provide the Special Master with an
"intelligible principle" that would have narrowed his discretion; he
could not simply do anything he wanted to do. But for the Special
Master's regulations and methodologies to survive judicial scrutiny,
the statute had to be read as giving him a great deal of discretion. In
most cases subject to such scrutiny, Congress is found to have pro-
vided an intelligible principle, while still giving the administrative
agency sufficient wiggle room to write regulations embellishing upon
that principle. That, according to Judge Hellerstein, was the case
here: the statute was specific enough to survive a nondelegation
challenge, but not so specific as to hamstring the Special Master's
efforts at regulatory creativity. Feinberg had threaded the needle to
the court's satisfaction.
Some unfortunate pronouncements attributed to the Special
Master, however, gave greater credence to a nondelegation argument
than the statutory text alone would provide. In the months following
his appointment, Feinberg is reported to have said, on more than one
occasion: "The law gives me unbelievable discretion. It gives me dis-
cretion to do whatever I want. So I will.' 64 If such a statement were
to be taken literally, then it would appear that (at least in the Special
162. Id.
163. FED R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
164. Kolbert, supra note 71, at 42, 48.
Spring 20051
Harvard Negotiation Law Review
Master's mind) the statute allowed just the type of uncanalized dis-
cretion found wanting in Schecter Poultry. 165 Fortunately for the
Fund, its constitutionality was judged (by Judge Hellerstein and, as
we shall see, the Second Circuit) on the basis of the statutory lan-
guage, rather than the Special Master's gratuitous remarks. So long
as the regulations and methodologies comported with the statute,
there was little available in the form of a judicial remedy, particu-
larly in light of the non-reviewability of the Special Master's award
determinations.
4. The Regulations Survive - Barely
That reality did not go unnoticed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit when it affirmed the District Court's
decision (sub nom Schneider v. Feinberg) on September 26, 2003.166
On appeal, a shorter, per curium opinion focused on the Chevron is-
sues. 167 Like the District Court, the Second Circuit declined to place
the Special Master in an interpretive cage. While stating that "any
cap on compensation would be a direct violation of the statute,"' 68 the
appellate court found no evidence of a de facto cap, stating, "the re-
cord does not show that the cut-off on the presumed-loss tables and
the "extraordinary circumstances" requirement for awards exceeding
$4 million constitute a sham or pretext.' 69 The court acknowledged
that Feinberg's comments "fuel an impression that the Special
Master has closed his mind to awards that exceed his idea of what is
appropriate in the most general sense of the word.' 70 These com-
ments, lacking the force of law, were not to be accorded Chevron def-
erence. But the court, in a bow to legal realism, recognized that
Congress
"has confided each award to the sealed box of a Special Master's
mind, has refrained from meaningful prescriptions, and has
placed the result beyond the reach of review .... So while we
agree with plaintiffs that the Special Master's comments are
165. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 495, 551 (Cardozo, J.,
concurring).
166. Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2003).
167. The nondelegation argument had been dropped on appeal. E-mail from John
Cambria, Counsel, Salans Law Firm, to author (Jun. 22, 2004, 07:34:43 EST) (on file
with author).
168. Schneider, 345 F.3d at 143.
169. Id. at 144.
170. Id. at 145.
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hard to square with the text of the Act, we decline to declare
what we cannot enforce."' 7 1
This statement acknowledges (but does not cure) the Fund's most
significant procedural flaw: the absence of judicial review of the Spe-
cial Master's award determinations. That, together with the absence
of any requirement for written explanation of awards, placed the Co-
laio/Schneider plaintiffs, and others like them, in a Catch 22: while
the Special Master's off-the-cuff statements might portend a scheme
at variance with apparent legislative intent, only his regulations (and
accompanying tables) were subject to judicial review. With his deter-
minations exempt from judicial review, he could, in fact, do whatever
he wanted - and he had more than hinted that he would. The fact
that many of us have the utmost respect for Feinberg, and believed
that in the end he would be eminently fair, could not mask the appar-
ent arbitrariness of the scheme. Indeed, even if the regulations
promised compensation precisely in the manner the plaintiffs de-
sired, the statute deprived them of any mechanism to insure that the
Special Master would follow his own regulations. 172 Even arbitration
provides more bases for judicial review. 173
The appeals court considered challenges to two specific regula-
tions: 28 C.F.R. § 104.41, defining the phrase "individual circum-
stances" to "include the financial needs or financial resources of...
the victim's dependents and beneficiaries," and 28 C.F.R. § 104.42,
construing the phrase "to the extent recovery for such loss is allowed
under applicable State law" (in the statute's definition of "economic
loss") as imposing a limitation, rather than a mandate, as to recovery
171. Id.
172. Courts are willing to interpret the language of judicial preclusion in a less
restrictive manner in order to allow judicial review of agency determinations (see
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 370 (1973)) unless there is "clear and convincing
evidence" of a contrary legislative intent (see Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
141 (1967)). Since the ATSSSA expressly states that decisions "shall be final and not
subject to judicial review," (see ATSSSA, supra note 16, at § 405(b)(3)) the "clear and
convincing" standard seems to have been met.
173. E.g., The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C § 10 (1996), expressly pro-
vides for review on the basis of corruption, fraud, or undue means; evident partiality
of the arbitrator; misconduct of the arbitrator; and excess of arbitral authority. Cases
arising under the FAA also provide for review on the basis of public policy (see, e.g.,
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 11 F. 3d 1189, 1194-96 (3d Cir. 1993)),
arbitrary and capricious awards (see, e.g., Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994
F.2d 775, 782 (11th Cir. 1993)), and manifest disregard of the law (see, e.g., Rodriguez
v. Prudential-Bathe Securities, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1202, 1209 (D.P.R. 1995). For a full
exposition of the statutory and nonstatutory grounds for judicial review of arbitration
awards, see THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE OF ARBITRATION 585-646 (2003).
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for economic loss. With respect to the latter regulation, the court
held that "[t]he use of the word "compensation" does not reflect un-
ambiguous Congressional intent to afford the same level of compen-
sation available under the tort law," noting that in other contexts,
Congress had "evinced clear intent to provide tort victims with com-
pensation to make them whole."1 7 4 The court also upheld the first of
these regulations, stating that "[tihe legislative decision to omit a cap
on awards does not impliedly foreclose needs-based considera-
tions."1 7 5 But it also made the following, head-scratching statement:
[T]he Special Master has said that very large awards justified
by economic loss would be unseemly. Thus, to the extent the
Special Master is employing a need-based analysis to compute
awards, he has introduced some limit on what would otherwise
be proper compensation under the Act. Such notion, in our
view, would seem to be contrary to what Congress aimed to ac-
complish in the statute. The overriding purpose of the statute is,
of course, fair compensation for economic and non-economic loss.
Therefore, even though the Special Master has authority to con-
duct a thorough analysis, he should take into full account a
claimant's economic loss, as specifically required by the statute,
before evaluating need-based circumstances. This slight shift in
approach has the virtue of more closely reflecting Congress' aim
as well as appearing to be more fair to claimants. 176
This is interesting advice to be sure, and perhaps a source of vin-
dication to the plaintiffs. Yet the absence of declaratory or injunctive
relief, combined with the absence of any mechanism for appealing the
Special Master's final determinations, resulted in no enforceable obli-
gations on the Special Master. So the Second Circuit allowed the reg-
ulations to survive, but just barely, and without great enthusiasm.
Moreover, with the December 22, 2003 deadline for filing of claims
with the Fund fast approaching, no effort was made to test the regu-
lations at the Supreme Court.
5. A Dynamic Interpretation
On its face, the statute seems to allow the regulations and meth-
odologies to pass muster (barely), consistent with the reviewing
courts' analysis. The Act defines economic and noneconomic losses in
a manner recognizable to tort lawyers, and employs these terms in
connection with the determinations to be made by the Special
174. Schneider, 345 F.3d at 146.
175. Id. at 148.
176. Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
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Master. It also expressly excludes punitive damages and requires
that any awards be reduced by amounts received from collateral
sources. But nowhere does the statute explicitly require that awards
otherwise replicate the awards the claimants would receive in a suc-
cessful tort claim. In that sense, the courts were correct: the statute
is ambiguous, perhaps in part because it was hastily drafted to meet
an emergency, perhaps in part because Congress did not really decide
(or wish to decide) whether it was crafting a substitute tort remedy or
an emergency assistance program. In its haste, Congress may not
have realized that it had left significant gaps to be filled in by a Spe-
cial Master who did not require congressional confirmation. Or per-
haps at least some members of Congress recognized these gaps, but
were happy to punt the difficult issues to an unelected
administrator. 177
The sparse legislative history is not particularly helpful. Some
members of Congress, such as Representatives Gephardt and Spratt,
left the impression that the Act would provide full tort recovery for
the victims and their families (although Spratt regretted that this
was the case). 178 Others, either contemporaneously with passage
(such as Senator McCain) or sometime thereafter (such as Senators
Hagel and Kennedy) suggested that the Special Master need not pro-
vide the equivalent of full tort recovery, particularly where it would
exaggerate financial disparities among claimants. 179 Efforts to re-
construct the legislative history so as to divine congressional intent
bring to mind Judge Harold Leventhal's admonition (later cited by
Justice Antonin Scalia) that such an undertaking is akin to entering
a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for
one's friends.1 8 0 The metaphor is particularly apt where the main
conversation at this particular cocktail party (reported in the Con-
gressional Record) focused on the airline bailout provisions of the Act,
with only occasional references to the Victim Compensation Fund.
177. In other contexts, then-Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist criticized
Congress of "abdicat[ing] its responsibility for the making of a fundamental and most
difficult policy choice," (Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 547
(1981)) and emphasized that Congress is "the governmental body best suited and
most obligated to make the choice." (Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 672 (1980)).
178. See 147 CONG. REC. H5892 (2001), supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
179. See Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), supra note
133 and accompanying text.
180. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Notwithstanding these problems, the structure imposed by the
Special Master reflected some of the more salutary aspects of the ad-
ministrative process. The regulations recognized the congressional
ambivalence, and amounted to a creative straddle that took into ac-
count (in roughly equal amounts) statutory language, likely congres-
sional intent, practical politics, administrative efficiency, and
fairness. They provided for awards resembling but not quite dupli-
cating traditional tort remedies, acknowledging disparities based on
income while tapering these disparities at the extremes. (The bottom
extreme was protected by the provision for minimum awards in 28
C.F.R. § 104.41.181 While the regulations provided for a minimum
before collateral sources, Feinberg in fact made no award under
$250,000, thereby further bolstering the awards at the lower end,
and making the Fund a viable option for many people who might oth-
erwise have brought suit.) Proceeds of life insurance policies (more
likely to be received by wealthy claimants), fell within the definition
of collateral sources; charitable gifts (a form of relief at least as likely
to be received by claimants of modest means), were excluded from
this definition, and therefore did not offset awards from the Fund.
Pain and suffering were presumed to have been experienced equally
among victims and beneficiaries. Taken as a whole, the regulations
and the methodologies they spawned represented an honest and in-
telligent effort to breathe meaning into a hurriedly-drafted statute
containing just the barest description of the basis for compensation.
The result was a humane compromise between a rigid, tort-based
formula and a softer, more needs-based formula for compensation.
Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon was the reviewing
courts' acceptance of the regulatory treatment of the Act's definition
of "economic loss." The interpretation provided by the regulations
(that the statutory language regarding applicable state law should be
treated not as a mandate, but as a limitation) was, in Judge Heller-
stein's view, a reasonable interpretation of that provision. It is rea-
sonable, I would say, but not the most likely interpretation of
congressional intent. No matter: given the reasonableness of the
Special Master's interpretation, and Chevron's command to the judi-
ciary to defer to reasonable administrative interpretations of stat-
utes, it did not matter that another interpretation was more likely to
reflect congressional intent. Many conservatives (e.g., Justice Scalia)
181. This provision states: "In no event shall an award (before collateral source
compensation has been deducted) be less than $500,000 in any case brought on behalf
of a deceased victim with a spouse or dependent, or $300,000 in any case brought on
behalf of a deceased victim who was single with no dependents."
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and liberals (e.g., Professor William Eskridge) regard legislative in-
tent as an amorphous concept;18 2 rather than struggle with congres-
sional intent, better to give the administrative agency charged with
applying the statute free rein to adapt the statute to reality, so long
as its interpretation is not entirely at odds with the statutory
language.
Scholars of legislation and administrative law might view the
regulations, along with Judge Hellerstein's Chevron analysis, as an
example of "dynamic statutory interpretation." Professor Eskridge, a
leading proponent of dynamic interpretation, has argued:
Interpretation is not static, but dynamic. Interpretation is not
an archeological discovery, but a dialectic creation. Interpreta-
tion is not mere exegisis to pinpoint historical meaning, but her-
meneutics to apply that meaning to current problems and
circumstances.
The dialectic of statutory interpretation is the process of under-
standing a text created in the past and applying it to a present
problem. This process cannot be described simply as the recrea-
tion of past events and past expectations, for the "best" interpre-
tation of a statute is typically the one that is most consonant
with our current "web of beliefs" and policies surrounding the
statute.183
A leading example of dynamic interpretation is United Steel-
workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, which upheld an affirm-
ative action plan in a collective bargaining agreement despite
complaints that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited such
arrangements.184 Of particular note is the concurring opinion of Jus-
tice Harry Blackmun, explaining that Congress, while enacting Title
VII, was unlikely to have anticipated the circumstances giving rise to
the affirmative action plan upheld in that case.' 8 5 Eskridge explains,
"Justice Blackmun argued that the evolution of Title VII created a
practical dilemma for unions and employers that justified affirmative
action in many cases."' 8 6 The Chevron case itself may be seen as an
example of dynamic interpretation in an administrative context. In
Chevron, the Court acknowledged the legitimacy of an administrative
182. Eskridge has called legislative intent "a psychological construct... in which
very few scholars still believe." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpre-
tation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1538-39 (1987).
183. Id. at 1482-83.
184. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979).
185. Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
186. Eskridge, supra note 182, at 1492.
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modification of regulations in light of changing policies and adminis-
trations (in this instance, the Reagan Administration's inclination to
reduce the federal government's role in environmental protection),
and recognized that both the original regulation and its modified ver-
sion could be consistent with the legislative command.
As in Chevron, the regulations pertaining to the Fund are an ad-
ministrative gloss on a Congressional enactment. But unlike the reg-
ulation considered in Chevron (or the judicial interpretation in
Weber), the Victim Compensation Fund regulations were promul-
gated more-or-less contemporaneously with the enactment of the
statute. Dynamic interpretation of the legislation establishing the
Fund reflected not changing circumstances over several years, but
rather, circumstances and problems that came to light only after op-
portunity for public comment and further consideration. Some
problems regarding the statutory scheme - like the deduction for col-
lateral sources which, if interpreted broadly, could have rendered
millions of dollars of charitable contributions meaningless -
presented practical dilemmas resolved not through judicial interpre-
tation but through thoughtful, "interpretive" regulations promul-
gated by the Special Master. To the extent they may appear to
deviate from the statutory language or (more likely) legislative in-
tent, this deviation was based not on changing times and conditions,
but because the statute was an emergency measure that failed - ei-
ther deliberately or due to the exigencies of the moment - to take into
consideration all of the variables with which the Fund's administra-
tors would have to contend. It was only natural that the responsible
agency would fill in the gaps, and altogether appropriate that it do so
not by trying to divine intent from ambiguity, but by wedding the
purpose of the statute to the demands of the situation, while remain-
ing faithful to the statute's explicit commands.187 Much as Eskridge
envisions judges as "diplomats, whose ordering authority is severely
limited but who must often update their orders to meet changing cir-
cumstances,"188 the Special Master crafted the regulations within the
statute's limitations but to meet circumstances that came to light
only when the realities of the situation became fully apparent. It was
187. The one deviation from the statute's express commands may have been the
awarding of a minimum of $250,000 to all death claimants, notwithstanding the stat-
utory provision requiring that amounts received from collateral sources be deducted
from all awards. This practice finds specific authority in neither the statute nor the
regulations.
188. Eskridge, supra note 182, at 1482.
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better for this to be done within the executive branch than the judi-
cial branch: the Chevron doctrine recognizes that it is preferable for
a more accountable "political branch" to engage in such an
exercise. 189
In this sense, the Special Master's regime was a typical manifes-
tation of the modern administrative state (albeit with a temporally
limited function): filling in gaps where Congress did not tread; mak-
ing rules that would have a major impact on peoples' lives, based on
vaguely-defined statutory criteria; and (on the downstream end) pro-
viding an expedited process with limited access to judicial review.
The administrative methodology emphasizes flexibility, expedience,
and, at its best, ingenuity, at a cost of strict adherence to statutory
language, congressional intent, and traditional procedural norms.
For better or worse, this is the way a modern administrative state
deals with complex issues, arising under exigent circumstances, in an
expeditious and politic manner.
Some critics would contend that expedience is not our most im-
portant value and that strict adherence to the will of Congress as the
only constitutionally endowed lawmaking body is of far greater im-
portance. Administrative expedience has been the basis of several
national and international horrors (consolidation of Hitler's power
following the Reichstag fire is a prime example; the Iran/Contra af-
fair is another, slightly more benign one). The NIRA was a response
to the Great Depression, an emergency of comparable scope to that
which spawned the Victim Compensation Fund, yet the Supreme
Court determined (in Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry) that
the emergency was no excuse for excessive delegation of congres-
sional lawmaking power. 190 But even under the best of circum-
stances, Congress could not anticipate all of the permutations of loss
and all of the variables that those charged with carrying out its statu-
tory commands would encounter, and late September, 2001 hardly
presented the best of circumstances. Some delegation of lawmaking
power would be necessary. Such a delegation would best be made to
a dispute resolution professional capable of understanding both the
full implications of the statutory text and the circumstances faced by
189. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984).
190. Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 391, 433; Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at
528. These and related cases provoked a popular attack on judicial activism which
may have caused the Court to recalibrate the nondelegation doctrine; as a conse-
quence, no federal statute has been struck down on this basis since 1935. Of course,
one aspect of that attack (President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan) was itself seen as
a step too far.
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victims of mass torts. As Professor Eskridge has suggested,
"[i]nterpretation is a contemporary interpreter's dialogue with the
text and with the tradition that surrounds it."191 And the dialogue
undertaken by the Special Master included the broader dialogue of
the notice and comment process characteristic of administrative rule-
making.
IV. THE ACTION DOWNSTREAM: FILE WITH THE FUND,
LITIGATE, OR SIT IT OUT?
A. The Fund's Claim Statistics
With the parameters for the Fund set by Congress, the rules for
its operation established by the Special Master, and both surviving
tests in the courts, the path was clear for the Fund to operate. The
Fund's intended beneficiaries faced a choice unfamiliar to personal
injury victims: to file a claim with an administrative apparatus set
up to deal with this unique situation, or to pursue litigation against
the airlines, security companies, and perhaps others in the courts,
subject to the limitations of ATSSSA § 408. For a long while, many of
the Fund's beneficiaries did neither. Despite its apparent attributes
and wide publicity, the Fund did not immediately attract a large vol-
ume of claims. As of August 11, 2003, over 2100 claims had been filed
with the Fund, of which 1200 were deemed eligible claims on behalf
of deceased victims. 192 Given that there were potentially almost
3000 death claims, that the Fund had been open for approximately a
year and a half, and that only four months remained until the Decem-
ber 22 filing deadline, the claims rate at that time appeared to be
disturbingly low.1 9 3
But four months later, as the filing deadline was reached, the
claims profile looked much different. Filings accelerated in the wake
of the Schneider decision, and more so as the filing period was about
to expire. In the month of December, 2003 alone, the Fund received
986 death claims and 1550 personal injury claims. Altogether, the
Fund received 2880 death claims deemed eligible for compensation,
representing claims from relatives of 97% of the 2976 September 11th
dead. These numbers exceeded expectations. Feinberg had stated,
191. Eskridge, supra note 182, at 1509.
192. While there was little outright fraud, some death claims were filed by several
relatives of the same victim, or by persons ineligible to file for a particular victim.
These had to be weeded out by the Special Master and his staff.
193. See Fisk, supra note 77, at Al, A10.
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just a few months earlier, that his goal was for 90% of the benefi-
ciaries to file either with the Fund or with the court; his greatest con-
cern was that some families might do nothing. 194 In the end, there
may have been as few as eight families eligible for death awards that
filed with neither the Fund nor the court. 195
The average award for death claims was $2,082,035, higher than
the median award, which was $1,677,633. Awards for families of de-
ceased victims ranged from $250,000 to $7.1 million.' 96 A total of
2680 legitimate personal injury claims were processed, with awards
ranging from $500 (for simple bruises) to $8.6 million (for serious
burn injuries). 97 It should come as no surprise that the highest in-
jury award exceeded the highest death award; the most serious inju-
ries would be accompanied not only by income deprivation, but by
substantial medical treatment, rehabilitation, and a lifetime of pain
and suffering. Because many people are likely to have never reported
minor injuries, it is impossible to obtain a denominator representing
the total of potential injury claims.' 98
194. Public meeting with Kenneth Feinberg, Special Master, in Philadelphia, PA
(Sept. 18, 2003).
195. The precise number of deaths for which nobody filed claims is difficult to as-
certain. Subtracting the 2880 eligible death claims filed with the Fund (figure ob-
tained from the Fund) and the eighty-five lawsuits filed with the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York (figure obtained from defendants' counsel) from
2976 (the most widely reported figure for total deaths) yields a remainder of eleven.
However, the Fund, using New York City's figures, claims a revised death total of
2973. In addition, as Table 1 indicates, the total number of claims (filed with the
Fund and the court) from the World Trade Center appears to exceed the number of
reported deaths from that site.
196. Table 12: General Award Statistics for Deceased Victims, in Final Report of
the Special Master for the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 110,
Table 12: General Award Statistics for Deceased Victims, available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/final-report.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2005). The report includes a series of
tables with detailed award statistics.
197. Id. at Table 12: General Award Statistics for Physical Injury Victims.
198. A Rand Institute for Civil Justice study reports 215 civilians seriously injured
in the September 11th attacks; the study defines "serious injuries" as "physical inju-
ries that resulted in hospitalization for one day or more in the immediate aftermath of
the attack." DIXON & STERN, supra note 79, at xxiii.
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TABLE 1
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
VCF Active Total Non-claimers
Awards Lawsuits Deceased [col, 3-(col. 1 +
Victims col. 2)]
AA Flight 11 (1 WTC) 65 21 87 1
UAL Flight 175 (2 WTC) 46 14 60 0
WTC ground victims 2,597 9 2,605 (1 extra claim?)
AA Flight 77 (Pentagon) 33 23 59 3
Pentagon ground victims 114 4 125 7
UAL Flight 93 (PA) 25 14 40 1
Totals 2,880 85 2,976 11 net
Sources:
For airplane totals, see Lucien J. Dhooge, A Previously Unimaginable Risk Potential:
September 11 and the Insurance Industry, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 687, 695 (2003), and subtract
the hijackers from each plane. For numbers on hijackers, see Press Release, U.S. Dept. of
Justice (Sept. 14, 2001), at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/091401hj.htm.
For total victims, see Jennifer Lin, A Third Have Not Filed for 9 / 11 Fund; Less Than Three
Weeks Remain to Apply for Federal Compensation, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 14, 2003,
at Al; LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11
ATTACKS 15 (2004). The VCF reports that the total number of victims has been reduced to
2,973. Telephone Interview with Camille Biros, Feinberg Associates (Feb. 10, 2005).
For Pentagon victims, see Steve Vogel, Pentagon Victims Honored; 400 Attend Wreath
Ceremony at Arlington National Ceremony, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 12, 2003, at Al.
Totals for VCF claims obtained from Feinberg Associates. E-mail from Camille Biros,
Feinberg Associates, to author (Jul. 1, 2004, 01:05 EST) (on file with author).
Totals for active lawsuits obtained from Desmond T. Barry, Jr. E-mail from Desmond T.
Barry, Jr., Condon & Forsyth, to author (Jul. 8, 2004, 12:16 EST)(on file with author),
updated through Memorandum from Tim Carter, Condon & Forsyth, to Desmond T. Barry,
Jr., Condon & Forsyth (Feb. 7, 2005) (on file with author).
Table 1 shows the distribution of death claims filed with the
Fund, as well as the distribution of § 408 death claims filed with the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Insofar as possible, the table differentiates these figures among the
four hijacked aircraft and the three buildings they struck. The data
comes from a variety of sources, and is difficult to reconcile. (As of
this writing, the total number of death claimants at the World Trade
Center site would appear to exceed the number of reported deaths by
one; the disparity may be greater if the downward revision of total
deaths to 2973 is attributed to that location.) Nevertheless, a few
observations are particularly striking:
1. The overwhelming majority (99%) of potential death claim-
ants filed somewhere; 97% filed with the Fund, while only
2% chose to file with the court.
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2. A disproportionately high number of survivors of Flight 93
victims (representing 14 out of 40 (35%) of the innocent pas-
sengers who crashed in Shanksville) opted for a tort claim.
Somewhat more surprisingly, of the 59 innocent passengers
on Flight 77 (which crashed into the Pentagon), 23 (39%) of
their families bypassed the Fund and filed claims with the
court.
3. A slightly smaller proportion (94.4%) of Pentagon-based vic-
tims are represented in claims filed either with the Fund or
with the court. Seven of the 125 Pentagon dead had no claim
filed on their behalf at all.
These data provide only numerical summaries - useful summa-
ries, to be sure - of the Fund's claims experience. Behind each of the
claims, and each decision to file suit or not to claim at all, is a story
involving a number of objective and subjective factors, which we shall
now explore. First among these factors is the viability of the litiga-
tion option, i.e., the pursuit of a tort claim under § 408 of the
ATSSSA.
B. The Litigation Option
The objections to the Fund discussed in Section IV of this article
would have carried less weight if the legislation establishing the
Fund provided potential claimants with the choice of "opting out" of
the conventional tort system. But recall that § 408 of the ATSSSA
transformed any civil actions against those arguably responsible for
the events of September 11th into a federal action, placed exclusive
jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York, and limited the
liability of airlines and others to their insurance coverage. 199 Had
the Fund simply been an option that the victims and their families
could pursue, it would have been hard to complain about its legal
consequences. Instead, the Act forced victims and their families to
choose between the Fund and what appeared to be a whittled down
tort remedy, thereby adding strength to arguments that the Fund
was inadequate in substance or deficient in procedural protections.
1. Has Anything of Value Been "Taken"?
The Act also raised a constitutional issue. By enacting § 408 of
the ATSSSA (imposing a number of conditions on civil actions
brought on behalf of September 11th victims against the airlines and
others), Congress had limited the recourse of plaintiffs in already
199. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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vested causes of action. Of course, the regulation of actions stem-
ming from aircraft accidents should clearly fall under Congress' com-
merce power, and therefore no constitutional issues derive from the
fact that this cause of action would normally arise under state law.20 0
This regulation might, however, raise policy questions, particularly
for those whose political rhetoric included a commitment to the devo-
lution of power from the federal government to the states.20 1
However, the retroactive restrictions on the right to sue the air-
lines and others could be seen as a due process violation - an uncon-
stitutional taking of property without just compensation. 202 In
addition, if the Victim Compensation Fund established as an alterna-
tive to tort litigation failed to provide a full tort remedy, the "takings"
argument would be sharpened. 20 3
Others have discussed the "takings" issue more fully,20 4 so I will
discuss it only briefly here. It would appear that none of the cases
cited in the literature is fully dispositive. Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. New York City20 5 and before it, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon20 6 set forth some of the major constitutional principles of
"takings" jurisprudence, but both of these cases involved real prop-
erty, and are therefore not on all fours with our issue. Duke Power
200. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). But see Erin G. Holt, Note:
The September 11 Victim Compensation Fund: Legislative Justice Sui Generis, 59
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 513, 539-40 (2004) (arguing that there is a "states' rights"
issue).
201. See Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism: Whatever Happened to
Devolution?, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 429 (1996).
202. Lee S. Kreindler, The Terrorist Attacks of 11 September 2001: Legal Liability
Issues Confronting Claimants - The Congressional Response - Salvation or Frustra-
tion?, 27 AIR & SPACE L. 377, 383 (2002).
203. Note that the Colaio/Schneider plaintiffs did not assert a "takings" argu-
ment; they did not wish to alter the consequences of § 408 so much as to improve their
recovery from the Fund. A takings argument might best be made by those who chose
to pursue a civil action, claiming that § 408 of the Act reduced their common law
remedy without providing an adequate substitute.
204. Robert S. Peck, The Victim Compensation Fund: Born from Unique Conflu-
ence of Events not Likely to be Duplicated, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 209, 218-20 (2003) (Peck
seems to think that the entire issue was resolved in Duke Power v. Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978)); Holt, supra note 200, at 541 (Holt
seems to consider "takings" jurisprudence inapposite here, but goes on to discuss the
issue in due process terms).
205. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
206. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.20 7 upheld the con-
stitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act,208 which provided a substi-
tute remedy to those injured by nuclear accidents. But the Price-
Anderson Act has prospective effect only; it does not eliminate or oth-
erwise affect remedies available in an already accrued cause of ac-
tion, unlike § 408 of the ATSSSA. A better analogy may be found in
the circumstances surrounding the Iran-United States Claims Tribu-
nal. There, a series of executive orders took Americans' pending
claims against Iran out of American courts and placed them in the
hands of a special international tribunal with a cap on total liability.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the executive or-
ders in Dames & Moore v. Regan,20 9 but declined to address the "tak-
ings" issue.210
In Duke Power, the Court considered whether a legislatively en-
acted compensation scheme was a satisfactory quid pro quo for the
common law rights of recovery the Price-Anderson Act abrogates.
Without deciding whether the Due Process Clause "in fact requires
that a legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the
recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute rem-
edy,"211 the Court determined that the Price-Anderson Act did pro-
vide "a reasonably just substitute for the common-law or state tort
law remedies it replaces."212 For reasons suggested below, it would
appear that the Fund provides "a reasonably just substitute" for the
remedies its beneficiaries would have under common law. Such a
finding might not only provide a constitutional defense; it would help
establish the fairness of the scheme as a matter of public policy.
2. Why the Fund Was, in Most Cases, a Better Remedy,
Objectively Speaking
Several obstacles confront those September 11th victims who
would pursue a conventional tort action, even without the limitations
of § 408. First and foremost, a finding of negligence on the part of the
airlines, security firms, airports, or aircraft manufacturers (to name
207. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000).
209. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
210. Id. at 688.
211. Duke Power v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. at 88.
The Court cited a number of cases supporting the proposition that "a person has no
property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law." Id. at 88 n.32. However,
§ 408 of the ATSSSA poses a somewhat different question because it affects already
accrued causes of action.
212. Id. at 88.
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the most obvious defendants) is anything but certain. Others have
catalogued the substantive problems facing such claims,2 13 so I will
list only a few here: the difficulty of establishing a pre-September
11th standard of care that any of the defendants breached; the diffi-
culty of establishing foreseeability (i.e., prior to September 11th,
whether a reasonable person could foresee that hijackers would fly
jumbo jets into skyscrapers); the related problem of proximate cause
(particularly for victims who were not passengers in the doomed air-
craft); and the diffusion of responsibility for safety among the poten-
tial defendants. These and other problems make the establishment
of liability anything but a slam-dunk proposition.
a. Judge Hellerstein's Decision in the § 408 Litigation
At least some of these obstacles have been rendered a little less
formidable by a September 9, 2003 decision rendered by Judge Alvin
K. Hellerstein, before whom the September 11th claims brought
under § 408 had been consolidated. In In re September 11 Litiga-
tion,214 approximately seventy September 11th survivors and injury
victims and ten entities which sustained property damage waived
their right to file with the Fund and brought suit against the airlines,
airport security companies, airport operators, the airplane manufac-
turer (Boeing), and the operators and owners of the World Trade
Center (the "WTC Defendants"). The defendants moved to dismiss
the claims, arguing that they had no duty to protect the plaintiffs
against terrorist attacks, and that the crashing of jumbo passenger
jets into large office buildings by terrorists was unforeseeable as a
matter of law.
Judge Hellerstein denied the motions, except for one related to a
strict products liability claim brought against Boeing for the Penta-
gon crash. 215 His opinion, rendered in the state that gave birth to the
Palsgraf case,216 was a mini-treatise on the law of proximate cause,
foreseeability, and duty. Drawing "all reasonable inferences in favor
213. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Grief Procedure, and Justice: The Septem-
ber 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 494-97 (2003); Alexan-
der, supra note 3, at 640-55; Rabin, supra note 2, at 586-87.
214. 280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
215. Judge Hellerstein dismissed this claim because Virginia, the state in which
the Pentagon is located, does not recognize strict products liability. Id. at 306, citing
Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 236 Va. 419, 374 S.E.2d 55,
57 n.4 (1988). Section 408(b)(2) of the ATSSSA requires that the court apply the law
"of the State in which the crash occurred unless such law is inconsistent with or pre-
empted by federal law."
216. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (1928),
the seminal case on duty, proximate cause and foreseeability, is cited only once in
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of the plaintiff[s],217 the court stated, inter alia, that (1) "plaintiffs
and society generally could have reasonably expected that the screen-
ing performed at airports by the Aviation Defendants would be for
the protection of people on the ground as well as for those in air-
planes;" 218 (2) "the crash of the airplanes was within the class of fore-
seeable hazards resulting from negligently performed security
screening;"21 9 (3) "[1]arge-scale fire was precisely the risk against
which the WTC Defendants had a duty to guard and which they
should have reasonably foreseen;"220 and (4) the terrorists acts did
not qualify, as a matter of law, as an 'extraordinary' intervening
cause;" 22 ' noting that "there ha[d] been many efforts by terrorists to
hijack airplanes," and "[t]he practice of terrorists to blow themselves
up in order to kill as many people as possible had] also been preva-
lent." Therefore, "[a]lthough there ha[d] been no incidents before the
ones of September 11, 2001 where terrorists combined both an air-
plane hijacking and a suicidal explosion," Judge Hellerstein could not
"say that the risk of crashes was not reasonably foreseeable to an
airplane manufacturer."222
The court invoked the maxim that "[i]n order to be considered
foreseeable, the precise manner in which the harm was inflicted need
not be perfectly predicted." 223 Thus, if the airlines had a duty to pro-
tect people on the ground from airplane crashes, or if the World
Trade Center owners had a duty to protect its occupants from fire,
the fact that these events would not have occurred but for the inter-
vention of terrorists did not cut off liability, particularly if some sort
Judge Hellerstein's forty-one-page opinion. In re September 11 Litigation, 280 F.
Supp. 2d at 295.
217. In re September 11 Litigation, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 289, citing Jackson Nat'l
Life Ins. Co. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 32 F.3d 697, 699-700 (2d Cir. 1994).
218. Id. at 292.
219. Id. at 296. "While it may be true that terrorists had not before deliberately
flown airplanes into buildings, the airlines reasonably could foresee that crashes
causing death and destruction on the ground was a hazard that would arise should
hijackers take control of a plane. The intrusion by terrorists into the cockpit, coupled
with the volatility of a hijacking situation, creates a foreseeable risk that hijacked
airplanes might crash, jeopardizing innocent lives on the ground as well as in the
airplane. While the crashes into the particular locations of the World Trade Center,
Pentagon, and Shanksville field may not have been foreseen, the duty to screen pas-
sengers and items brought on board existed to prevent harms not only to passengers
and crew, but also to the ground victims resulting from the crashes of hijacked planes,
including the four planes hijacked on September 11." Id.
220. In re September 11 Litigation, 280 F. Supp. 2d. at 302.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 307.
223. Id. at 295. For a case frequently cited for this proposition, see Derdiarian v.
Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (1980).
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of terrorist activity on airplanes or in regard to the World Trade
Center was foreseeable.
Throughout the opinion, the court took pains to point out that its
decision fell far short of a final ruling on the merits, that the litiga-
tion was at an early stage, and that discovery, proof, and a jury deci-
sion would have to follow in order for the plaintiffs to ultimately
prevail. 224 Still, by surviving the motions to dismiss, the plaintiffs
had surmounted a significant hurdle in the § 408 litigation.
b. The Realities of Tort Litigation
But even if the legal problems could be surmounted and plain-
tiffs' verdicts obtained, some of those verdicts may not be quite as
generous as suggested by the lawyers and actuaries retained by the
likes of Cantor Fitzgerald. 225 Empirical research suggests that in
both trial and settlement, a substantial discount is made in tort cases
where economic loss is large. A Rand study of airline accident cases
has revealed that as independently-assessed economic losses to survi-
vors of crash victims increase, the percentage of those losses received
by survivors as compensation - through tort judgments and settle-
ments - declines. 226 According to the study, once survivors incurred
economic loss in excess of $250,000, their total recovery (including
noneconomic loss) was significantly less than their economic loss
alone; once economic loss exceeded $2,000,000, the compensation de-
clined to under forty percent of that loss. 227 Amounts received in set-
tlement and as a consequence of jury verdicts were similar in this
224. In re September 11 Litigation, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
225. For discussion regarding Colaio claims, see supra text accompanying notes
128-176.
226. Rand researchers performed the assessment using the "human capital" ap-
proach to determine economic loss. Airline crashes provided a good sample, because
liability in these cases is rarely disputed and contributory negligence is almost never
at issue. In addition, because most victims die quickly, other elements of damages,
such as pain and suffering and medical expenses, are rarely factors that will cause
significant variations in awards or settlements. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really
Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - and Why Not?, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1216 (1992) citing JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS AND COMPEN-
SATION PAID IN AVIATION ACCIDENT LITIGATION 86-95 (1988). While in a tort action
regarding September 11th losses, liability could be very much at issue, the economic
consequences of these losses are quite similar to those sustained in commercial airline
accidents.
227. Id. at 1217, Table V. Limited data from more recent cases suggests higher
awards in aviation accident cases. DIXON & STERN, supra note 79, at 34-35. Using
the Rand Institute for Civil Justice's database, Dixon and Stern found twelve plain-
tiffs verdicts in aviation wrongful death cases between 1994 and 1999, with mean
and median awards of $7.4 and 5.6 million, respectively (adjusted to 1999 dollars). Id.
at 35.
[Vol. 10:135
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
regard,228 although it is likely that jury verdicts were, by and large,
higher than settlements.229 Unfortunately, an explanation for this
phenomenon is not readily available. 230 Perhaps jurors and negotia-
tors consciously or subconsciously cap off such losses even in a fault-
based system. If so, the Special Master's inclination to taper off re-
covery for economic losses may reflect a reality not incorporated into
the figures projected by Cantor Fitzgerald and other advocates of
more generous awards for high-end claimants.
The value of any judgment obtained in a conventional tort action
would be further eroded once the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees (ranging
from twenty-five to forty percent of total recovery) were taken into
account. This factor looms particularly large when a tort action
under ATSSSA § 408 is compared to a claim on the Fund, which a
substantial number of lawyers were willing to pursue pro bono. It
would be a fair question to ask some of the more aggressive plaintiffs'
attorneys how much of their clients' money they were willing to in-
vest in transaction costs (in the form of their own fees) in order to
prove the point that a tort action, rather than a Fund claim, was
worth pursuing. In addition, the substantial time required for discov-
ery, pre-trial motions, trial, appeal, and collection of any judgment
would have to be compared to the 140 days within which any claim to
the Fund would have to be determined and paid.231
At one time (before the overwhelming majority of potential
claimants opted for the Fund), the greatest risk of a potential tort
action may have been the collectibility of a judgment against the air-
lines. In the absence of § 408(a)'s limitations on liability, the likely
effect on the airlines of judgments in excess of insurance coverage
would have been bankruptcy, with "successful" plaintiffs receiving
just pennies on the dollar. One of the involved airlines, United, did in
fact file for Chapter 11 protection shortly after September 11th, not-
withstanding the assistance of the ATSSSA, and it is doubtful that it
228. Saks, supra note 226, at 1216.
229. DIXON & STERN, supra note 79, at 35.
230. In Schneider v. Feinberg, the Second Circuit, in sustaining the Special
Master's regulations, took note of its earlier observation that "'the projection of future
income at [high] levels' of earnings is 'itself extremely conjectural.'" 345 F.2d 135,
144, quoting McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 282 F.2d 34,
39 (2d Cir. 1960) (en banc).
231. ATSSSA, §§ 405(b)(3) (providing for no more than 120 days from filing of
claim to determination by Special Master) and 406(a) (requiring authorization of pay-
ment within twenty days of determination).
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would have been able to emerge intact with billions of dollars of un-
derinsured contingent liabilities hovering over a bankruptcy proceed-
ing.2 32 Absent § 408, American Airlines, the nation's largest carrier,
might have found itself in similar straits. Section 408's limitation of
damages to the airlines' insurance coverage might therefore be seen
as a legislatively-constructed anticipatory bankruptcy workout.
Rather than sitting back and waiting for an avalanche of competing,
speculative claims against a limited fund (i.e., the airlines' assets),
Congress limited the airlines' liability to their existing insurance and
created as an alternative a special Fund with unlimited resources, to
which claimants could queue up and obtain guaranteed payment.
Ironically, because the great majority of the potential claimants
in fact availed themselves of the Fund, substantial funds remain in
the insurance pool for the eighty-five survivors of deceased victims
who ultimately chose to pursue a tort action. The survivors of
twenty-one victims on American Airlines flight 11, which crashed
into One World Trade Center, might have to share the $1.5 billion in
insurance on that flight (assuming a judgment against American Air-
lines) with the survivors of a handful of victims in the skyscraper who
also brought suit.2 33 These victims (assuming that they can recover
in tort) will have to share that coverage with other claimants, includ-
ing personal injury victims not eligible for relief from the Fund234
and those claiming ground damage (which could number in the
thousands). Not so for the fourteen survivors of victims of United
Airlines flight 93, which crashed in Shanksville. With no ground
damage resulting from that crash, these survivors (again, assuming a
plaintiffs' verdict) would have the $1.5 billion that insured that air-
plane to themselves, far more than would be necessary to satisfy any
tort judgments. In either case, the very success of the Fund in at-
tracting ninety-seven percent of the potential claimants resulted in a
substantial insurance pool for those who chose to take their chances
in court.
c. A Rational Choice
Even so, when measured against the likely (rather than theoreti-
cal) outcome of a conventional tort action, even absent the constraints
232. United Airlines has thrice been denied loan guarantees under the ATSSSA,
and as of this writing, its long-term viability remains in doubt. Scott McCartney, The
Middle Seat: What's Ahead for United and Its Fliers as the Government Bows Out of
Bailouts, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2004, at Dl.
233. See Table 1, supra p. 848.
234. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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of § 408, the Fund looks like an excellent option for the overwhelming
majority of eligible claimants. 235 Indeed, those who experienced Sep-
tember 11th-related injuries but are ineligible to make claims on the
Fund (e.g., those who sustained inhalation injuries or property loss)
may have more reason to complain about § 408's limitations on liabil-
ity; they are subject to those limitations, even though they were pre-
cluded from making claims on the Fund.23 6 The real prospects for
recovery in a conventional tort action against the airlines and others
lend practical support to both the limitations on recovery imposed by
§ 408 and the Special Master's inclination to taper off awards to the
Fund's high-income claimants. Moreover, given the risks of conven-
tional litigation, the Fund would appear to have been a "reasonably
just substitute"237 for the traditional common law remedy, thereby
fending off a constitutional challenge. 238 Therefore, under rational
choice theory, 239 under which decisions are based entirely on the
likely economic outcome, most potential claimants will have chosen
to cast their lot with the Fund.
C. Subjective Economic Factors
Pursuit of a tort action under § 408 might nevertheless be a ra-
tional choice for certain limited categories of potential claimants.
One such category consists of beneficiaries of particularly well-in-
sured decedents. James Debeuneure, 58, a Washington, D.C. school-
teacher, died aboard American Flight 77 when it hit the Pentagon.
His son, Jacques Debeuneure, 34, a Matthews, N.C. postal worker,
has brought suit against American Airlines.240 Debeuneure has said
235. The attributes of the Fund over more conventional alternatives may have
frightened some personal injury lawyers who may have seen the Fund as a harbinger
of broader tort reform to come. See Roger Parloff, Tortageddon - Why the September
11 Victims' Fund Could Become a Template for Mass Tort Reform, THE AM. LAW.,
Mar. 2002, at 106.
236. For elaboration on this point, see Rabin, supra note 2, at 579.
237. The quoted phrase is found in Duke Power 438 U.S. at 88; see supra notes
211-12 and accompanying text.
238. As of this writing, none of the § 408 plaintiffs has mounted a constitutional
challenge to the damages limitation of that section of the Act.
239. Rational choice theory "presumes parties will act so as to maximize their ex-
pected utility, which involves comparing end states that might result from alternative
behaviors discounted by their likelihood of occurring. In economic analysis of law [it
is assumed that parties] will act to maximize their expected wealth." Olivia A. Radin,
Rights as Property, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1322-23 n.41 (2004), quoting George S.
Swan, The Law and Economics of the Blaine Amendments: Zelman v. Simmons-Har-
ris and Romer v. Evans, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 301, 320 n.148 (2003).
240. Debeuneure v. American Airlines, Inc., 02 Civ 00452 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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that his father was so well-insured that the offset for collateral bene-
fits would leave him with no recovery from the Fund. 241 While the
Special Master's practice of awarding a minimum of $250,000 to each
claimant might modify this analysis, for claimants who were already
beneficiaries of substantial insurance proceeds (or proceeds from
other collateral sources), litigation under § 408 is probably a rational
choice.
A second category involves those for whom adequate insurance
coverage was apparent even before the overwhelming majority of po-
tential claimants opted for the Fund. Most prominent among the
members of this category are survivors of those who died aboard
United Airlines Flight 93. That flight crashed in a rural area outside
Shanksville, Pennsylvania with forty innocent passengers on board.
There have been no claims for collateral damage on the ground, leav-
ing all of the airplane's estimated $1.5 billion in liability insurance
for the passengers' survivors. Given the natural sympathy a jury
would have for the Flight 93 passengers (who are believed to have
attempted to wrest control of the airplane from the terrorist hijack-
ers), their survivors might take the calculated risk of bringing a civil
action. 242 Claims statistics seem to have borne this out: whereas
overall, only 85 out of 2,976 September 11th deaths (3%) have re-
sulted in § 408 claims, 14 out of 40 Flight 93 deaths (35%) have re-
sulted in such claims.
The above reasoning applies, to a lesser extent, to the survivors
of the 59 victims aboard American Airlines Flight 77, which crashed
into the Pentagon. The Pentagon crash resulted in the deaths of 114
people on the ground (the survivors of four of whom who have sued);
any significant property damage on the ground was sustained by the
United States government, an unlikely plaintiff. Twenty-three of the
fifty-nine Flight 77 deaths (i.e., 39%) have resulted in § 408 claims,
an even greater percentage than those connected with Flight 93. If
limited recourse to the airlines' assets (i.e., through the limitation on
241. Martin Kasindorf, Some 9/11 Families Reject Federal Fund and Sue, USA
TODAY, Jul. 14, 2003, at Al.
242. Note, however, that damages in this action would not be determined simply
by dividing $1.5 billion by fourteen. The plaintiffs (except for any carrying interna-
tional tickets) would have to show fault on the part of the airline; they then would
have to prove damages, which would be substantial in most death claims, but far
short of the $107 million dividend produced by dividing the insurance equally among
the plaintiffs. Note, however, that the damages would not be subject to the collateral
source offset which diminishes awards from the Fund.
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recovery to their liability insurance) was regarded as the biggest ob-
stacle to recovery under § 408, then rational choice theory can ex-
plain why a disproportionately large number of Flight 93 and Flight
77 deaths (involving less competition for such assets) resulted in tort
claims.
D. Noneconomic Factors
An assessment of the estimated economic return from litigation
would not, in most cases, be the sole determinant of whether a poten-
tial claimant would elect to sue, file with the Fund, or sit it out. As
adherents of socioeconomics would assert, other, noneconomic factors
would also play a legitimate role, notwithstanding rational choice
theory. 243 Among these factors are the following:
1. Risk Preference
While the economic model of litigation suggests that litigants
will accept only those settlement offers that are at least equal to their
expected return from litigation, many potential litigants are risk-
averse, and will therefore accept something less in order to avoid the
risks of litigation.244 Tort plaintiffs frequently fall into this category;
as one-time players, they can ill-afford the lottery aspects of tort liti-
gation, and are therefore somewhat disposed to accept settlements
below the expected value of litigation. 245 And people who have exper-
ienced serious tragedy may consider themselves star-crossed or un-
lucky, and therefore that much more reluctant to take their chances
in court. 246
243. See Robert Ashford, Socio-Economics: What Is Its Place in Law Practice?,
1997 Wis. L. REV. 611, 612-15 (1997) (detailing the basic premises of socio-economics).
244. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70
S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 118 (1996); see also Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Prefer-
ence, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2003) (arguing that "people are
often willing to take risks to avoid losses but are unwilling to take risks to accumulate
gains").
245. "To calculate expected value of litigation.., litigants will multiply their esti-
mate of the plaintiffs chances of prevailing on the liability issue by the plaintiffs
likely damages." Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 6 (2002).
246. Liability insurers, on the other hand, can exploit this vulnerability. Aware of
the risk-aversion of many tort plaintiffs, they can make low-ball settlement offers,
knowing that some will be accepted. While some of the rejected offers may result in
trials with adverse results, the cumulative results will average out to no more than
their expected value over time, making this a profitable (if cynical) strategy for these
repeat players. This may explain Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud's observation that
"insurance companies systematically offer only a fraction of the expected value of per-
sonal injury judgments in cases with substantial damages...." Samuel Gross & Kent
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As they faced the decision to sue or claim with the Fund, poten-
tial beneficiaries were in a situation not unlike that of the typical tort
plaintiff who has received a settlement offer. These individuals could
view estimates of the expected award from the Fund (available
through the Special Master's office) as tantamount to settlement of-
fers to be compared with the expected value of a § 408 claim against
the airlines and others. Many of these potential claimants, having
already experienced serious tragedy, would be understandably reluc-
tant to take their chances in litigation. For them, the certain recov-
ery provided by the Fund might eclipse even the rosiest of projections
of success in litigation.
Of course, a few potential claimants may have had a preference
for risk. While a gambler mentality is rare among one-time players
(and in particular, tort plaintiffs), some of these claimants may have
received enough support from insurance, charities, and other non-
Fund sources to serve as a cushion against risk. For others, a totally
subjective preference for risk may have won out. Moreover, in a soci-
ety that values individual autonomy with respect to litigation
choices, these claimants were perfectly within their rights to give ef-
fect to their preferences in the form of a civil action under § 408 of the
ATSSSA.
2. Self-serving Bias
Some attorneys (as well as their clients) may be prone to self-
serving bias, a tendency to view one's prospects (in this case, in litiga-
tion) as better than they really are. 24 7 Surveys of lawyers show that
a great majority of them are likely to consider themselves "better
than average" lawyers who are capable of achieving better than aver-
age results (the "Lake Woebegone effect"). 248 In fact, empirical evi-
dence suggests a tendency to overestimate the value of one's claim,
Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases
for Trial, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 319, 353 (1991).
247. See Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 567, 567 (2003) (defining self-serving bias as "the tendency to make
various judgments in a manner skewed to favor one's own self-interest"); George
Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22
J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993); Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in
Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 13-19 (1999).
248. See Birke & Fox, supra note 245, at 17-19; Rees W. Morrison, In-House Coun-
sel are Paid to Make Decision. Tips for Avoiding Traps, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 2001, at 39
(describing overconfident lawyers who are overly certain of the correctness of the ap-
plicable law).
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one's poker hand, or even outcomes over which one has no direct
control. 249
In the context of the choices presented with respect to the Victim
Compensation Fund, potential claimants, and especially their law-
yers, would have to resist a tendency to overvalue their prospects at
trial. Beneficiaries would be best served by lawyers who leavened
their appraisals of trial outcomes with a dose of realism, and even a
conscious effort to counteract self-serving bias. The relatively low
number of § 408 claims that were ultimately brought suggests that
they may have done so.
3. Endowment Effect
A more likely factor with respect to § 408 claims was the endow-
ment effect 250 of traditional norms of tort litigation. Attorneys (and
to a lesser extent, clients) accustomed to conventional measures of
tort damages and the traditional process of tort litigation may have
become inured to both substantive and procedural norms, and there-
fore unwilling to accept a different damages formula and a different
process. 251 Furthermore, having seen in the statute definitions of ec-
onomic and noneconomic loss that resembled the tort definitions,
lawyers and their clients may have developed an expectation against
which the estimates furnished by the Special Master appeared pal-
try.252 Rather than seeing a multimillion-dollar Fund award as a net
249. See Bruce L. Hay, The Theory of Fee Regulation in Class Action Settlements,
46 AN. U. L. REV. 1429, 1462 n.120 (1997). See also Joseph Rand, Understanding
Why Good Lawyers Go Bad: Using Case Studies in Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal
Decision-making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 731, 743 (2003) (describing gambler's false belief
that numbers on a roulette wheel can become "due"); Birke & Fox, supra note 247, at
16-17.
250. See RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 77 (2002), citing
Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 325 (1990) (describing the endowment effect as a manifes-
tation of "loss aversion," the generalization that losses are weighted more than gains
in the evaluation of prospects and trades). See also Jennifer Arlen, The Future of
Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1771 (1998) (The en-
dowment effect occurs when people "demand significantly more to give up an object
than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.").
251. One prominent aviation litigator called the Fund "the new legal disaster-
land." Kreindler, supra note 202, at 377.
252. Roger Parloff, responding to the carping of plaintiffs' lawyers, summarized
the issue: "If the victims may have no viable claim in the tort system after all, be-
cause no one was really at fault for their deaths other than the terrorists, then why
must a compassion-driven, taxpayer-financed fund pay what the tort system might
theoretically have extracted from a totally hypothetical, deep-pocketed, unambigu-
ously guilty defendant?" The answer lies, says Parloff, in "the otherworldly sense of
entitlement that the tort system now fosters." Parloff, supra note 235, at 106.
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gain, potential Fund beneficiaries may have viewed it as a loss as
compared to the traditional measures of tort damages or the expecta-
tions derived from the statutory language.
One manifestation of this endowment effect was the Colaio!
Schneider litigation. That litigation amounted to an effort to bind the
Special Master to norms of traditional tort damages which the plain-
tiffs by then had come to regard as an "entitlement."253 But most of
the plaintiffs who failed to overturn the regulations in that litigation
nevertheless saw the Fund as superior to litigation under § 408, and
eventually filed with the Fund. Others did not, possibly because they
used a 100% recovery under a traditional tort damages formula as
their lodestar (notwithstanding any of the discounting factors previ-
ously discussed). For them, full tort recovery was an entitlement, an-
ything less was viewed as a loss, and the Fund was an inadequate
substitute for litigation.
4. Reactive Devaluation and Displaced Aggression
Reactive devaluation is a phenomenon that occurs when a party
to negotiations, suspicious of the motivations of her negotiating part-
ner, places a lower value on an offer from that partner than an objec-
tive appraisal might warrant. 254 Reactive devaluation is most
prevalent where the negotiators regard each other as adversaries.
While the Special Master was neither technically nor actually in a
position adversarial to that of the Fund's beneficiaries, some prospec-
tive Fund claimants may have come to regard him (or the structure
underlying the Fund) with suspicion. The Fund's beneficiaries had
been subjected to terrible personal tragedy on September 11th, and
the hypervigilence that often accompanies such tragedy may have
created suspicions regarding the motives underlying the Fund.2 55
With Osama bin Laden unavailable, and the airline executives and
other government officials inaccessible, the very visible Kenneth
Feinberg became a convenient target of their wrath. "I was the point
253. Peck, supra note 204, at 224.
254. Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. DIsp. RESOL. 235, 246-47 (1993); Lee Ross, Reac-
tive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 26, 41-42 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
255. "After catastrophe, some survivors experience extreme and persistent arousal
in the form of anxiety, panic, hypervigilance, irritability, and insomnia." Deborah
Serani, Expanding the Frame: Psychoanalysis after September 11, BULL. OF THE MEN-
NINGER CLINIC, Winter 2004, at 4.
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man, so I became the target for every conceivable type of emotional
response to 9/11," said Feinberg. 256
Kenneth Feinberg accepted no compensation for his work on the
Fund.25 7 He toiled tirelessly for hundreds of hours, traveling to scores
of locations to address Fund beneficiaries and others and respond to
their questions and complaints. To some, he has been patient, under-
standing, and gracious. To others he has appeared blunt, arrogant,
and condescending. 258 Steven Brill, who chronicled the events follow-
ing the September 11th attacks, describes him as lacking in bedside
manner.25 9 To a great extent, Feinberg's character was in the eye of
the beholder: what some saw as honesty, candor, and intelligence,
others saw as aloofness, chilliness, or arrogance. In large part due to
his public availability, Feinberg came to personify the Fund, and
some of the responses to the Fund reflected people's reactions to
him.260
Thus, despite, or perhaps because of his good intentions, Fein-
berg and the Fund he administered became a target of displaced ag-
gression on the part of those who had been grievously harmed by the
events of September 11th, and especially those who viewed the Fund
as inadequate. 261 The data would suggest, however, that the dis-
placed aggression was more likely to manifest itself in comments
about the Fund or delays in filing, rather than outright refusals to
file with the Fund. In time, despite whatever hostility they may have
felt toward the Fund, its legislative creators, or its administrators,
most potential claimants came to realize that the Fund was their best
option.
256. Lisa Meyer, 9111 Fund Chief Looks Back on Incredible Times, ASSOCIATED
PRESS NEWSWIRES, July 5, 2004.
257. "To accept payment would have been like taking blood money," said Feinberg.
Interview with Kenneth Feinberg, Special Master, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 11,
2003).
258. See Kolbert, supra note 71; BRILL, supra note 15, at 335-37.
259. BRILL, supra note 15, at 313, 322.
260. Feinberg endured the brickbats with exceptional equanimity. "Of course
they're angry," said Feinberg of the Fund's intended beneficiaries. "Why shouldn't
they be, after what they've been through?" Interview with Kenneth Feinberg, Special
Master, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 11, 2003).
261. Displaced aggression is a psychological phenomenon "by which a person redi-
rects his or her aggressive impulse onto a target that may substitute for the target
that originally aroused the person's aggression." SURVEY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE: PSY-
CHOLOGY SERIES 163 (Frank N. Magill ed., 1993) (attributing this to Sigmund Freud).
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5. The Need for an Explanation and to Assess Blame
When terrible things have happened to a loved one, there is a
natural need for an explanation, a refusal to believe that horrible
tragedy was merely a product of chance. Tyler and Thorisdottir have
observed:
People find it troubling to believe that accidents with wide-
spread and devastating consequences can occur without the
negligence of someone. If people believe that some party is re-
sponsible, they can then believe that the event could have been
controlled.... As human beings, we feel uncomfortable believ-
ing that mass harms can occur by chance, and that we are,
therefore, powerless to defend against them. So, we seek a way
to view their occurrence, or at least the damage they cause, as
due to the failure of some person (or persons) to exercise due
care.
262
This tendency is particularly pronounced in the United States,
where (as Bob Cochran and I have noted elsewhere) many of us enter-
tain the notion that we are entitled to lead lives free from tragedy;
that it is our birthright to proceed through life without mishap, at
home in a land where "seldom is heard a discouraging word and the
skies are not cloudy all day," and that, should something go wrong,
the courts will be available for redress.263 In some sense, this is a
healthy attitude in that it reflects the American sense of optimism, of
perfectability, 264 of control over one's environment and one's fu-
ture.265 The belief that resort to the courts will make things right
reflects a peculiarly American confidence in legal institutions. It may
be preferable to the fatalism that pervades some other cultures or to
the extralegal "self-help" measures employed in societies where judi-
cial institutions have proven unreliable. But this attitude can also
deteriorate into a process of "naming, blaming, and claiming"266 that
262. Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 5, at 365.
263. COCHRAN & ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 172.
264. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 426-28 (Harvey C.
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop trans., 2000) (describing how equality suggests to the
Americans the idea of the indefinite perfectibility of man).
265. COCHRAN & ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 172.
266. The phrase comes from the title of a widely-cited article on the emergence
and transformation of disputes. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
631 (1980).
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brings out the worst aspects of American litigiousness. 267 If some-
thing goes wrong in America, there must be an explanation, probably
grounded in somebody's culpability.268 And no event was more dis-
turbing to the American sense of perfection than the tragedy of Sep-
tember 11, 2001.
Among the September 11th families there were those who felt
that only by bringing a lawsuit could they discover who truly was to
blame, and that accepting payment from the Fund would be a be-
trayal of their loved ones. Thomas Ashton, age 21, died at the World
Trade Center on September 11th. His mother, Kathleen Ashton,
explained:
Some day, please God, I will see my son again. I need to be able
to look at him and say, "Tommy, I did the right thing." The right
thing is not to take the money. The right thing is to try to get
answers, to see what sort of lapses allowed the murderers to do
what they were able to do.269
A lawsuit not only allows for discovery and, in some instances,
accountability; it can also provide the emotional catharsis sought by
victims of harm.270 For some claimants, that catharsis was missing
from the Fund's claims process. Lacking a rationale based on fault
(indeed, lacking a clear explanation for the basis for compensation),
the Fund looked to some like a payment without substance - a hid-
den, under-the-table process in place of a public expiation.
This reaction may have been perplexing to would-be tort reform-
ers such as Marc Franklin, who urged (almost four decades ago) that
the conventional negligence system be replaced with a comprehensive
no-fault system, funded at least in part by tax revenues.271 Franklin
was among the first to describe the problem of a "negligence lottery"
of which there were two major aspects: a "plaintiffs lottery" under
which the ability to recover for injury was dependent upon finding a
solvent person or entity on whom to cast blame,27 2 and a "defendant's
lottery" in which the amount the defendant was obligated to pay was
267. But see Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L.
REV. 3, 6-7, 38 (1986) (finding that empirical data does not support the notion that
Americans have been especially litigious of late).
268. See, e.g., Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 5, at 368.
269. Kasindorf, supra note 241.
270. Tyler and Thorisdottir fault the Fund and its creators for failing to consider
or explain the rationale underlying the Fund's rules. Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note
5, at 358. This failure may have deprived some claimants of the closure they might
have otherwise obtained from legal process.
271. See Marc Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Se-
lective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967).
272. Id. at 781.
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largely dependent on the characteristics of the plaintiff - most nota-
bly the plaintiffs likely future income stream.273 Viewed in any light
other than the perspective of a tort lawyer, the basis for liability and
the amount of compensation looked rather odd. In Franklin's words,
"there is no logical reason why treatment of the transgressor should
be tied inexorably to treatment of the victim." 2 74 And it is equally
odd for "Itiwo defendants who commit identical careless acts [to] find
themselves liable for vastly different amounts depending solely on
the fortuitous nature of the harm that results."275 The solution
would be a broad system of no-fault recovery from a fund financed
with tax dollars and motorists' fees, with "selective reimbursement"
from certain business enterprises.27 6 Specific deterrence in the form
of criminal prosecution and administrative regulation would substi-
tute for whatever deterrent effect the tort law was thought to
provide.2 77
In a modified manner and for a single event, this is what the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund attempted to do. Sepa-
rating the treatment of the transgressor from compensation for the
victim, it provided no-fault recovery (far more generous than that
contemplated by Franklin, Jeffrey O'Connell, and other Great Soci-
ety-era visionaries 278 ) from a Fund financed by the American tax-
payer. Selective reimbursement could be found in the government's
maintaining a right of subrogation (subject to the limitations on lia-
bility of § 408),279 which allows the government to pursue Al Qaeda -
the most culpable wrongdoer. Specific deterrence is provided in the
form of greater federal regulation of and more direct government in-
volvement in airline security. 280 Yet some critics of the Fund, instead
of applauding its separation of compensation from culpability, have
suggested that "the government itself implied that it was responsible
273. Id. at 790.
274. Id. at 781.
275. Franklin, supra note 271, at 790.
276. See id. at 812.
277. See id. at 781. The term "specific deterrence" was used by Professor (now
Judge) Guido Calabresi to describe safety regulations enacted collectively, as distin-
guished from the "general deterrence," or market-based approach. GUIDO CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 95-134 (1970).
278. Franklin, for example, would have provided full medical payments and
eighty-five percent of lost income (subject to a then-economically feasible cap of $125
per week), with no recovery for noneconomic loss. Franklin, supra note 271.
279. ATSSSA § 409.
280. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.
597 (2001).
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in some way for failing to prevent the tragedy from occurring by com-
pensating the victims because compensation typically flows from feel-
ings of responsibility for harm."28' This is an interesting piece of
reverse engineering. Because it stepped up to the plate and offered to
make generous payments to injured citizens at a time of national
tragedy, the government was now implying that it was at fault. This
insistence on associating compensation with fault once again demon-
strates the gravitational effect of the traditional norms of the tort
system.
6. Avoidance
Of course, many Fund claimants welcomed a process that would
allow them to recover substantial compensation without undergoing
the trials, tribulations and delays of tort litigation. For some in-
tended beneficiaries, even filing with the Fund may have been too
great an emotional burden. Despite the availability of a no-fault rem-
edy, and the formulaic manner in which the Special Master was pre-
pared to treat the claims, the form for those claiming on behalf of a
decedent was a long one - nine pages of instructions, plus twenty-
four pages to fill out, to be exact. Even with free legal help (along
with free assistance provided by other professionals), the task ap-
peared daunting to some.
Many Fund claimants kept their involvement to a minimum.
Until very late in the claims process some potential claimants were
too overwhelmed by grief to bring themselves to assemble the re-
quired documentation and file a claim. Among those who did, most
availed themselves of Track A of the claims process, 28 2 which did not
require a hearing before a written determination; of these people,
many accepted the Special Master's written determinations of their
claims. Declining to avail themselves of the hearing allowed under
both Tracks A and B, these people avoided what Bernard Mayer has
called the "tyranny of participation." 283
281. Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 5, at 359.
282. 1349 of the 2880 death claimants and 2387 of the 2673 injury claimants
availed themselves of Track A. E-mail attachment from Camille Biros, Feinberg Asso-
ciates, to Robert M. Ackerman, Professor of Law, The Penn State Dickinson School of
Law (July 1, 2004) (on file with author).
283. BERNARD S. MAYER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: CONFRONTING THE CRISIS IN CON-
FLICT RESOLUTION 54 (2004). For the most part, Mayer favors engagement in conflict
resolution, but he recognizes that people sometimes need protection from "the 'tyr-
anny of participation' that conflict resolution processes can seem to impose." Id.
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Indeed, the Fund seemed particularly well-suited for those who
wished to spare themselves the agony of reliving the horrors of Sep-
tember 11th, limiting their participation to the submission of a paper
claim. In the final analysis, only a handful (no more than a dozen
families of deceased victims) avoided engagement altogether, declin-
ing to seek out a remedy from either the courthouse or the Fund.28 4
7. Resentment of the Commodification of Life
Some potential claimants considered it unseemly to reduce the
value of their loved ones' lives to dollars and cents, and therefore hes-
itated to file claims with the Fund. While this sentiment could have
applied to tort claims as well, awards from the Fund appeared more
formulaic, less tailored to the individual circumstances of the victim,
and therefore seemed to depersonalize (and even commodify) the de-
ceased more than damages in tort. Deborah Hensler has commented
on the difficulty of placing any value on a loved one's life, and how for
some victims the "money [from the Fund] came to mean, not just the
wherewithal to cover their needs, nor a means of assuring accounta-
bility, nor even an expression of society's compassion for their plight,
but rather, what the lives of their children were worth in the eyes of
the community."28 5 Likewise, George Priest has noted the sense in
which "the awards granted under the September 11 Fund serve as a
surrogate for a measure of the value of the lives of the victims who
perished on September 11th."28 6 If so, then many such awards
seemed wanting.
8. Patriotism
Kenneth Feinberg has surmised that at least a few of the Fund's
intended beneficiaries may have considered it unpatriotic to impose
on the United States Treasury for compensation as the country com-
menced a war against terrorism. 28 7 This may have been particularly
284. Determining the precise number of deceased remains difficult, as does deter-
mining the number of families of deceased victims who have declined to file with the
Fund or the court. Press estimates place the latter number at thirty, but my best
estimate, based on numbers obtained from the Fund, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, and plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel in the Septem-
ber 11th litigation, places the number between nine and sixteen. See Table 1 supra p.
848.
285. Hensler, supra note 5, at 438.
286. George L. Priest, The Problematic Structure of the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 527, 544 (2003).
287. Interview with Kenneth Feinberg, Special Master, September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 11, 2003).
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true for those who were serving the armed forces (in military or civil-
ian capacity) at the time of the attacks. This may help explain why
families of those who died in the Pentagon filed with the Fund at a
lower rate than Fund beneficiaries in general.
9. Intra-family Squabbles
Feinberg reports several instances in which two or more family
members squabbled over who would file for compensation and who
would get the money. Such disagreements occurred only in a minor-
ity of the families, but they often were bitter. Observed Feinberg:
Biological parents fighting with fianc6s, sisters fighting with
brothers, spouse one fighting with spouse two... The statute
didn't give us much guidance at all about how to deal with those
family squabbles. 288
In some of these instances, Feinberg and his staff turned into
mediators to resolve family conflicts. In one such instance, blood rel-
atives of a September 11th victim agreed to share Fund proceeds
with the victim's gay partner to the extent the partner's live-in status
altered the victim's consumption rate, and thereby increased the
award. 28 9 It is reasonable to assume that some intra-family disputes
were a cause of delayed filings with the Fund.290
10. Holding Out for More Information
Some late filers hesitated to submit their claims until they had a
better idea of what kind of payments were likely to be made to claim-
ants in their circumstances (although Feinberg had, from the begin-
ning, provided data to the public about awards in representative
claims). 291 Some waited to file until the conclusion of the Colaio/
288. Meyer, supra note 256.
289. Interview with Kenneth Feinberg, Special Master, September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 11, 2003).
290. For additional reports of intra-family disputes, see Neil Swidey, Judge, Jury,
Exchequer as Special Master of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, Ken-
neth R. Feinberg Alone Puts a Price Tag on the Lives Lost and Injuries Suffered in the
Terrorist Attacks, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 1, 2004, at 10 (detailing conflicts including
"[tihe parents who don't recognize a victim's same-sex partner; the parents who filed
fraud charges against a woman claiming to be a fiancee but who they claim is just a
gold digger; the widows who learned their husbands had secret families; the fathers
who walked out on their kids only to come forward to make a claim after one was
killed on 9/11"); Stephanie Saul, Sad State of Estates, 9/11 Families Take Funds
Fight to Court, NEWSDAY, Sept. 21, 2003, at A8 (describing disputes that "pit ex-wives
against mistresses, parents against widows, and children against children").
291. The Fund's website, http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/awardsum-
maries.pdf, provides a number of examples of awards (with anonymity preserved) for
comparison's sake. 28 C.F.R. § 104.34 provides the Special Master with the right to
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Schneider litigation. 292 Holding out seemed to be a strategy more
often utilized by those who expected larger awards, as the size of the
median and average awards continued to creep up throughout the life
of the Fund.
11. Fear of Reprisal
A few potential claimants had privacy interests; some were un-
documented aliens who (despite assurances to the contrary from the
Special Master) were afraid that their information would be shared
with the immigration authorities. Others may have had similar mis-
givings regarding the Internal Revenue Service. Furthermore, de-
spite efforts to disseminate information regarding the Fund through
U.S. embassies and other outlets abroad, some relatives of the de-
ceased may have been foreign nationals who were late to get word
about the Fund.
In short, there any number of reasons for filing late in the claims
period, filing a tort claim with the court, or not filing at all. But for
the overwhelming majority of Fund beneficiaries, the Fund was the
most logical choice, not because it was "the only game in town," as
Feinberg claimed, 293 but because it was the best way to obtain eco-
nomic relief from the horror of September 11th. Most claimants ulti-
mately valued certainty, timeliness, and administrative convenience
over the factors that might drive them to bring suit. Other processes
might provide more information about the events of September 11th,
or the emotional support necessary to deal with loss, but this was not
the Fund's mission. For most claimants, weary, disdainful of process,
and seeking closure, the Fund was the most logical choice.
V. EVALUATING THE FUND
The circumstances surrounding the Victim Compensation Fund's
creation were unique, and we hope and pray they will remain so. As
publish some or all of the awards. In addition, the Special Master and his staff were
willing to meet with claimants and their representatives and provide estimates of
awards before claims are filed.
292. The number of filings accelerated after the District Court's dismissal of Co-
laio v. Feinberg, 03 Civ. 0558 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), and again after the Second Circuit
affirmance in Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2003). Of course, by the
time Schneider was decided, time was running short to file with the Fund in any
event.
293. BRILL, supra note 15, at 314, 321. Some beneficiaries resented Feinberg's
choice of metaphor; for them, the consequences of September 11th were anything but
a game. Id. at 336-37.
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one commentator has suggested, the Fund was "born of a unique con-
fluence of events not likely to be duplicated."294 Even if future acts of
terrorism on American soil cause thousands of deaths and injuries,
Congress is unlikely to respond with a program quite this generous
again. Robert Rabin suggests that "the establishment of the Fund
reflected a mix of genuine outpouring of sympathy for the victims of
September 11th and great concern that the airline industry faced in-
stant meltdown. Under these compelling circumstances, from a polit-
ical economy perspective, the federal government's decision to
assume responsibility for victim compensation played out in a singu-
lar fashion."295
Because the Fund is sui generis,296 it is unlikely to have a
profound impact on developments in the law of torts. The Fund expe-
rience does shed light on the normative value of conventional tort
rules and processes, and the manner in which people respond to
tragic loss, as discussed in Section IV. Beyond that, the lasting les-
sons we are most likely to draw from the Fund experience involve the
role of the administrative process in lawmaking and conflict resolu-
tion. We have discussed the legal implications of the administrative
process in Part III, and the factors involved in claimant choices in
Part IV. We shall now examine the Fund's administrative process in
terms of democratic governance.
A. The Fund's Administrative Process and Democratic Governance
The Fund embodied several of the frequently-cited attributes of
the administrative process. The upstream process was distinguished
by its capacity to fill gaps in legislation, taking advantage of the sub-
ject-matter expertise of the administrative agency. Here, where the
underlying statute was emergency legislation, the advantages of ad-
ministrative gap-fillers constructed by a person of Feinberg's exper-
tise proved particularly useful, even though controversial. The
downstream process was less cumbersome and more efficient than
the traditional judicial process. To the extent the Fund's objective
was to provide quick, no-fault compensation to victims who did not
294. Peck, supra note 204.
295. Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the Context of September 11,
88 VA. L. REV. 1830, 1867 (2002).
296. Several people have used this term in connection with the Fund, including
Kenneth Feinberg himself. See, e.g., Holt, supra note 200; Schneider, supra note 213,
at 460; Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 155 (2003). See also Interview with Kenneth Fein-
berg, Special Master, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 11, 2003).
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wish to be burdened with litigation or to relive the horror of Septem-
ber 11th, the claims process again seems to have served its purpose.
There remain, however, legitimate objections to both the up-
stream processes through which the rules for the Fund were promul-
gated and the downstream processes used by the Fund. In a recent
article in a symposium on mandatory arbitration, Richard Reuben
identifies "certain core substantive values of democratic governance
that may be used to assess the democratic character of arbitration,
namely: a dispute-resolution method, process or system."297 Reuben
employs the term "democratic" broadly; he states (and I agree) that "a
purely majoritarian understanding [of democracy] fails to meaning-
fully account for the place of governmental dispute resolution within
a system of democratic governance." 298 At the conclusion of his arti-
cle, Reuben invites us to consider "how might democracy theory in-
form other aspects of dispute resolution. . . and how might what we
have learned about dispute resolution inform our understandings of
democracy?" 299 He suggests that such inquiries "can and should also
be directed at the public adjudication context."300 Indeed, even more
so than in arbitration (an essentially private process), democratic
principles should weigh heavily in an evaluation of an administrative
process established by Congress to provide compensation from the
public treasury to victims of a national tragedy. So we shall endeavor
to do so here.
As the "core substantive values of democratic governance," Reu-
ben lists participation, accountability, transparency, rationality, per-
sonal autonomy, equality, and due process, along with the "social
capital values" necessary to promote civil society.30 1 Because (unlike
297. Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbi-
tration, 67 DUKE J. OF LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 282 (2004).
298. Id. at 284.
299. Id. at 320.
300. Id.
301. Reuben, supra note 297, at 285-86, 291. For other descriptions of procedural
justice criteria, see E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PRO-
CEDURAL JUSTICE 93-117 (1988); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85-90 (1971). In
a recent article regarding the significance of the landmark administrative due process
case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), Judith Resnik notes that the case "details
the key features of procedural systems - notice, exchange of information between dis-
putants in writing or orally [in] hearings, and decision-making by a third party who is
constrained in some respects." Judith Resnick, The Story of Goldberg: Why This Case
is Our Shorthand, in CIVIL PROCEDURES STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THE LEADING
CIVIL PROCEDURES CASES (Kevin Clermont ed., 2004).
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arbitration) the processes surrounding the Fund involved law-mak-
ing, I shall add majoritarianism to the list; while not the sole attri-
bute of democracy, it remains an important value in the context of
democratic law-making. In addition, because efficiency was obvi-
ously one of Congress's goals in establishing the Fund, I shall add
that to the list as well.30 2 While in Part IV, we focused on the inter-
action between the Fund and individual claimants, here our focus is
broader and more systemic.
1. Majoritarianism
I have restricted analysis of majoritarianism to the law-making
process, as it would appear unsuitable for the adjudicative process in
a society that does not endorse mob rule.30 3 In the context of the law-
making process, majoritarianism is a fundamental value of democ-
racy. Reuben has noted:
Democracy's essential theory is the consent of the governed, a
concept that is implemented through the democratic value of
participation. Under this social contract theory, the exercise of
coercive government power is seen as legitimate because laws
are enacted with the consent of those who will be bound by
them. In most democracies, this consent is achieved through
representation rather than direct participation. 30 4
302. Arguably, efficiency is not a value of democratic governance; in fact, democ-
racy can be notoriously inefficient. However, while democracy may require both up-
stream and downstream processes to gear down, it does not require that sand be
tossed into the gears. Professor Reuben has suggested that "responsiveness" might be
a better term, but that term arguably incorporates majoritarianism and accountabil-
ity as well as efficiency. See E-mail from Richard Reuben, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, to author (Aug. 30, 2004) (on file with
author).
303. Granted, some majoritarian institutions occasionally play an adjudicative
role, such as Congress in impeachment proceedings. However, here, the role of the
"majority" is carefully circumscribed, and representative, republican aspects apply.
To the extent impeachment decisions resemble referenda rather than the application
of legal standards, they have been criticized. See L. Darnell Weedon, The Clinton
Impeachment Indicates a Presidential Impeachable Offense is Only Limited by Consti-
tutional Process and Congress' Political Compass Directive, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
2499 (2001). The jury system, in which the decision-makers are drawn from the citi-
zenry at large, usually requires unanimity, rather than a mere majority.
304. Reuben, supra note 297, at 287, citing Geraint Parry, Types of Democracy, in
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: THEORIES, THINKERS, AND CONCEPTS 364, 365-367 (Seymour
Martin Lipset ed., 2001); ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSI-
TION (1971). While Reuben has made this observation with respect to the participa-
tion value, it would appear to apply with equal weight to the majoritarian value of
democratic governance.
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George Priest has suggested that "[t]he September 11 Fund will
remain controversial because the source of the definition of its
awards - however able and committed - is not in any sense demo-
cratic."30 5 Indeed, regulations drafted by a Special Master - not sub-
ject to Senate confirmation, but appointed by a Senate-confirmed
Cabinet officer who was in turn appointed by a President who
reached office while failing to obtain a majority of the popular vote -
appear less "democratic" than -legislation enacted by Congress. But
the objection here is not really any different than the classic objection
to the adoption of administrative regulations that have the authority
of law; i.e., that only the duly elected legislative branch, and not
unelected bureaucrats, has the power to make law.3 0 6
As a practical matter, the review and comment process used to
fashion regulations for the Fund provided far greater opportunity for
citizen input than the process that precedes the adoption of most leg-
islation, and the Special Master's report accompanying the Interim
Final Rule evidenced serious consideration and incorporation of
many of the comments thereby obtained. But to those unfamiliar
with administrative rule-making (and the Fund provided many peo-
ple with their first such encounter), refinement of legislative rules by
an unelected, interim, ad hoc government official smacked of authori-
tarianism and disregard for conventional democratic processes. 30 7
Perhaps the most legitimate majoritarian objection to the Fund
lies in the ambiguity of its Congressional mandate, i.e., that Congress
gave the Special Master factors to consider in making awards, but
305. Priest, supra note 286, at 545. Priest cites Guido Calabresi's earlier observa-
tions regarding "the necessity of selecting particular types of bodies to make difficult -
in his word, tragic - decisions, such as the value of life." Id. at 544-45, citing GuIDo
CALABRESI & PHILLIP BOBBirr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
306. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Prob-
lem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 761 (2003)
(noting, inter alia, that "institutions creating regulations, critics charge, are not suffi-
ciently accountable to voters and are too vulnerable to rent-seeking by special inter-
ests"); Daughter of Miriam Center for the Ages v. Matthews, 590 F.2d 1250, 1257 (3d
Cir. 1978) (noting that "Near the center of the growing concern over legitimacy [of
administrative rulemaking] lies the apprehension that the critical choices of our soci-
ety will more and more be made by administrative personnel who are not, as a practi-
cal matter, accountable to anyone.").
307. For a manifestation of this view in the popular press, see Joel Brinkley, Out
of Spotlight, Bush Overhauls U.S. Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2004, at Al
(describing changes in rules by Bush Administration "done through regulation, not
law - lowering the profile of the actions"). To lawyers, administrative regulations are
very much a part of the law, but Brinkley's language reflects the popular equation of
law with legislation.
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never came out squarely in favor of either a tort-based, corrective jus-
tice framework or a welfare-based, distributive justice scheme.308
For that matter, Congress, exercising its budgetary authority, proba-
bly should have placed some kind of limit on the total amount to be
disbursed by the Fund. Arguably, Congress shirked its duty in fail-
ing to make what some would regard as essential policy determina-
tions. 309 But at the time, Congress had many things on its plate, and
its default regarding these decisions allowed for considered adminis-
trative choices after notice and comment.
2. Participation
Participation is an important democratic value for both lawmak-
ing and adjudicative processes. The ability to participate effectively
in lawmaking - whether or not one's view is ultimately adopted - is a
fundamental principle of democratic governance, enshrined in such
documents as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution,
and in particular, the "right to petition" clause of the First Amend-
ment.3 10 Likewise as to the adjudicatory process, the right to counsel
and the right to confront witnesses are but two examples of constitu-
tionally-guaranteed aspects of the value of participation in decisions
directly affecting oneself.311 Effective participation requires access,
the right to be heard, and some degree of responsiveness. In the con-
text of civil disputes, perceptions of procedural justice "are enhanced
to the extent that disputants perceive that they had the opportunity
to present their views, concerns, and evidence to a third party and
had control over the presentation ("opportunity for voice")."31 2 These
perceptions of procedural justice, and in particular, the opportunity
308. See Hensler, supra note 5, at 421-55; see also Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note
5, at 369-75.
309. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
310. Congress shall make no law abridging the right of the people to "petition the
government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
311. For contemporary cases providing for fundamental participation in adjudica-
tion, see, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (ruling that detainees must be
allowed access to lawyer and a trial); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633
(2004).
312. Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice
Got to Do with It, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 820 (2001); see also E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R.
TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 101-04 (1988). Professor
Welsh goes on to explain that "disputants [also] are more likely to perceive procedural
justice if they perceive that the third party considered their views, concerns, and evi-
dence," and that "disputants' judgments about procedural justice are affected by the
perception that the third party treated them in a dignified, respectful manner and
that the procedure itself was dignified." Id.
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for "voice," seem to strongly influence participants' satisfaction with
the overall proceeding, regardless of the substantive outcome. 313
On the upstream end, time constraints resulted in little opportu-
nity for direct participation by potential beneficiaries in the making
of the legislation that established the Fund.314 But thereafter, it
would be difficult to conceive of an instance in which a government
agency made greater efforts to inform a core constituency of its plans
and to seek its input as to its rules and operating procedures. The
notice and comment process elicited thousands of comments that
were read and taken into account as the regulations were drafted and
revised. 315 The Special Master held numerous meetings with poten-
tial Fund beneficiaries, before, during, and after the promulgation of
the rules. 316
Downstream, the Special Master continued to hold group meet-
ings in a number of cities as beneficiaries sought assistance in pre-
paring their claims.3 17 A number of regional assistance centers were
opened. Furthermore, Feinberg and members of his staff were avail-
able to potential claimants who desired an estimate of their awards
before deciding whether to file suit or claim with the Fund.3 18 The
313. Id. at 821. "Through a long series of experiments involving many different
settings and situations, disputants' opportunity for voice has been found to "reliably
affect" perceptions of procedural justice. "[Wihen disputants [feel] that they [have]
been allowed a full opportunity to voice their views, concerns, and evidence, the dis-
puting process [is] seen as fairer and the outcome [is] more likely to be accepted." Id.,
quoting E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authori-
ties, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 180 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1988).
314. Even here, the voices of potential claimants were heard, albeit indirectly,
through the participation of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America in the draft-
ing process. Peck, supra note 204, at 217-25. In addition, all constituencies were at
least theoretically represented through their elected representatives in Congress.
315. Reuben notes, "[Plarticipation values are ... promoted in... the notice-and-
comment processes in administrative rulemakings." Reuben, supra note 297, at 288,
citing the APA at 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 554(d) (2000).
316. It is therefore puzzling that two of the Fund's critics have stated that "there
were no hearings or other forums in which people could articulate their views about
what type and level of compensation was appropriate," and that "[bleneficiaries of the
Fund were never asked for input and did not get the opportunity to express their
feelings, or argue for what they thought was appropriate compensation for their loved
ones." Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 5, at 384.
317. By September 18, 2003, when I attended one of Feinberg's meetings with
Fund beneficiaries in Philadelphia, the only people in attendance were Feinberg, a
member of his staff, a lawyer from Trial Lawyers Care, a newspaper reporter, a news
photographer, and me. (Fairness requires me to report that a hurricane had been
forecasted for the area, there had been at least one prior meeting in the Philadelphia
area, and Philadelphia is not an area in which a large number of Fund beneficiaries
are located.)
318. See BRILL, supra note 15, at 322, 478-79.
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actual claims process allowed claimants to choose between submit-
ting a paper application only, going to hearing after learning the re-
sults of the paper application, and going directly to hearing.
Claimants could bring counsel or other advisors into the hearing,
could present evidence in a wide variety of ways, and receive a re-
spectful hearing from the Special Master or one of the forty-one pro-
fessionals he employed to assist him. Claimants requesting that
Feinberg hear their cases personally were accommodated, and ulti-
mately he heard 867 of the 3526 cases that went to hearing.3 19 And
due to the efforts of Trial Lawyers Care and other volunteers, the
opportunity for voice was real, not just theoretical. Sometimes par-
ticipants in a legal process find their best voice through a profes-
sional advocate, and the volunteer effort provided many Fund
beneficiaries with such voice.
3. Accountability
Professor Reuben notes: "Accountability refers to the degree to
which the government can be held responsible to the citizenry for its
policies, words, and actions."3 20 While legislators may be held to ac-
count through the electoral process, 32 1 other government officials,
particularly in the executive branch, may be held accountable in
other ways, such as judicial review. It is in this particular area
where the Fund's most serious procedural shortcoming is apparent.
Were we to grade the Fund's accountability on the upstream end,
we would give it a "C," and the C is for Chevron. The basic structure
for the Fund was established by Congress, which remains accounta-
ble through the electoral process. But with major gaps to fill, some of
the most significant rule-making was left to an appointed Special
Master with no direct accountability to the electorate. The rule-mak-
ing was, however, subject to judicial scrutiny, thanks to Judge Heller-
stein's ruling in Colaio that § 405(b)(3), while precluding review of
the Special Master's determinations, did not preclude judicial review
of his regulations, methodologies, and policies prior to such determi-
nations. 3 22 The judicial scrutiny was, in turn, subject to Chevron def-
erence. As we have seen (and as the Second Circuit noted with less
319. E-mail from Camille Biros, The Feinberg Group, to author (Aug. 12, 2004) (on
file with author).
320. Reuben, supra note 297, at 288.
321. Id.
322. Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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enthusiasm than Judge Hellerstein), this deference allowed the Spe-
cial Master quite a bit of wiggle room. His regulations had to be "rea-
sonable" under the statute, but the court was not free to substitute its
own "reasonable" interpretation for that of the Special Master. We
have come to accept this as an appropriate distribution of executive
and judicial power in an administrative state - an eclectic acknowl-
edgment of the needs of a modern democracy.
It is on the downstream end, however, where accountability all
but disappeared. Under § 405(b)(3) of the act, the Special Master's
determinations as to claims were "final and not subject to judicial
review." Likewise, the regulations provided that "[t]here shall be no
further review or appeal of the Special Master's determination." 323
The absence of recourse to a reviewing court naturally gives rise to
the concern that awards will be arbitrary. Legal realists3 24 might
say that in the absence of judicial review, there was really nothing to
prevent the Special Master from ignoring his own regulations in the
fashioning of awards, even if the regulations themselves were subject
to judicial review (as they were in Colaio /Schneider). Such concerns
were not dampened by the Special Master's ill-considered statement:
"The law gives me unbelievable discretion. It gives me discretion to
do whatever I want. So I will."3 2 5
It appears, however, that he did not. While it is uncertain in the
absence of written explanations for the awards, the data provided by
the Special Master strongly suggests that he did, in fact, follow his
own regulatory guidelines in fashioning awards. There is every rea-
son to believe that the Special Master administered the Fund with
the utmost integrity. But in a government of laws, not men, the
proper functioning of the administrative process cannot depend en-
tirely on the probity of a single individual.326 Here, Tyler and Thoris-
dottir's criticism of the Fund finds its mark: "Placing most of the
323. 28 C.F.R. § 104.33(g) (2002).
324. Legal realism embraces the concept that legal decision-makers "decide cases
according to their own political or moral tastes, and then choose an appropriate legal
rule as a rationalization." Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Natu-
ralized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 267 (1997), quoting RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 3 (1977). An appellate tribunal might serve as a constraint
on arbitrary decision-making, but no such constraint exists in the absence of review.
325. Kolbert, supra note 71, at 42, 48.
326. "Rare is the person who can weigh the faults of others without putting his
thumb on the scales." Byron J. Langenfield, at http://www.worldofquotes.com/author/
Byron-J-Langenfield/l.
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authority for implementation in the judgments of one person, no mat-
ter how competent or well motivated, does not reflect procedural
justice."327
It is one thing for a party to a dispute to voluntarily agree to an
arbitral proceeding in which the right to appeal is waived in favor of
an expedited determination.3 28 It is quite another thing to be denied
the right to appeal by statute. We can appreciate the need for an
expedited process under these circumstances, but limited judicial re-
view of arbitrary administrative conduct would not have compro-
mised the efficiency of the scheme. As a practical matter, it would
hardly have been resorted to at all. The availability of review, how-
ever, would not only have served as a check on a less trustworthy
official, but perhaps more importantly, would have engendered
greater confidence on the part of the Fund's constituents. 329
Two constraints on the downstream process provide a saving
grace: First, the availability of a more-or-less conventional tort ac-
tion not only provided potential Fund claimants an element of choice
(as in voluntary arbitration), but it also served as a competitive con-
straint on the Fund administrators. Feinberg and his staff could not
be too parsimonious (or too arbitrary) without risking a mass defec-
tion to the tort remedy the Fund was constructed to avoid. The sec-
ond constraint was a market constraint. Feinberg did not take on the
administration of the Fund out of the blue; he was, and remains, a
dispute resolution professional, with an interest not only in future
work, but in retaining his good name. Integrity, fairness, and profes-
sionalism in the administration of the Fund would and should work
to Feinberg's professional benefit, and thereby serve as a safeguard
against arbitrary determinations. In this sense, Feinberg was like a
professional arbitrator, whose future work depended on the quality of
his past work. Moreover, Feinberg's probity was not compromised by
327. Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 5, at 376.
328. Along with Professor Reuben, I would distinguish cases in which parties'
agreement to arbitrate is truly voluntary from the "arbitration by ambush" that ap-
pears with growing frequency in consumer and employment contracts. See Acker-
man, supra note 12, at 69; See Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of
ADR?: An Argument That the Term "ADR" Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000
J. Disp. RESOL. 97 (2000).
329. Feinberg himself acknowledged this point: "To vest such authority in one
group, however credible and qualified, without opportunity for appeal, raised percep-
tions of unfairness and guaranteed second-guessing by claimants determined to com-
pare their awards with others." Final Report of the Special Master for the September
11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 81, at http://www.usdoj.gov/finalreport.pdf
(last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
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a "repeat player" syndrome that is said to affect the work of arbitra-
tors who are called upon to rule between unevenly matched adversa-
ries in a series of disputes. 330
4. Transparency
Transparency relates to the openness of government decision-
making.331 It is closely related to accountability in the sense that
without transparency, there is little opportunity for accountability.
This can be seen in the context of the awards made by the Fund. Be-
cause the Special Master was required to "notify the claimant in writ-
ing of the final amount of the award, but need not create or provide
any written record of the deliberations that resulted in that determi-
nation,"332 there was little basis on which to challenge the Special
Master's determinations. 333 Indeed, the absence of a written expla-
nation of awards, together with Congress' failure to articulate a ratio-
nale for compensation, lend credence to Tyler and Thorisdottir's
contention that "it is going to be very difficult for beneficiaries of the
Fund to look at the compensation offer and determine whether justice
has been done." 33 4
The Special Master did provide a degree of transparency on a
cumulative basis. Throughout the Fund's life, he provided almost
daily updates regarding median awards and average awards. He in-
dicated the range of awards for each income level and provided exam-
ples of awards, describing the circumstances while maintaining the
anonymity of the claimants. 335 This was yet another effort to provide
information to potential claimants so that they could proceed with
the claims process in an informed manner. It also provided the trans-
parency needed for public accountability, at least as to the general
330. "Repeat player syndrome" allegedly occurs when parties "repeatedly select
favorite arbitrators, who then return the favor with biased decisions in favor of the
repeat players." Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Em-
ployment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 777, 786 (2003), citing Lisa B. Bingham, Employment
Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189, 214
(1997).
331. Reuben, supra note 297, at 289.
332. 28 C.F.R. § 104.33(g) (2002).
333. This is not unlike the rule applied in many arbitrations, that an opinion need
not accompany an award. Even (or perhaps especially) where the scope of review is
narrow, it is surmised that providing the neutral's reasoning only invites scrutiny. Of
course, this is precisely what we like to encourage when government action is
involved.
334. Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 5, at 382.
335. Much of this information remains available on the Fund's website at http:l!
www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/.
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operation of the Fund, as distinguished from the particulars of each
award. Few public agencies have subjected themselves to this level of
scrutiny on a daily basis. Upstream, once the law-making process
advanced past the early-morning huddle in Speaker Hastert's office,
the notice and comment process provided precisely the type of trans-
parency anticipated under the Administrative Procedure Act.
3 36
5. Rationality
"Rationality, in the democratic sense, refers to the consistency of
governmental decisions with the law, social norms, or public expecta-
tions," explains Reuben. "It correlates with notions of equal protec-
tion and due process, and in the United States is secured by the Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as statutory pro-
tections against arbitrary and capricious decision-making by govern-
ment agencies. 337
A number of commentators have suggested that the Fund's chief
weakness stemmed from Congress' failure to articulate a consistent
rationale for compensation. 338 Whether the Fund was a corrective
justice mechanism, based on the tort model, or a distributive justice
mechanism, based on the social welfare model, was an issue that
would trouble Feinberg as well as others. Those who had previous
exposure to the tort system clung to a corrective justice norm; the
Colaio /Schneider litigation was clear evidence of this expectation.
But other social norms, including at least some people's notions of
fairness, suggested a more equal distribution of benefits. Feinberg
ended up crafting a compromise that had elements of distributive jus-
tice (and perhaps practical politics) at the high and low ends, but
which for the great majority of claims employed a corrective justice
model. To Feinberg and many of us who examined the system, it was
about as rational as one could reasonably hope for. But to those with
different expectations, the scheme seemed arbitrary and subjective.
336. "The purpose of the [Administrative Procedure Act] is to bolster clarity, con-
sistency, and public participation in federal agencies." James Hunnicutt, Another
Reason to Reform the Federal Regulatory System: Agencies' Treating Nonlegislative
Rules as Binding Law, 41 B.C. L. REV. 153, 189 (1999).
337. Reuben, supra note 297, at 289-90, citing inter alia, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 706 (2003)
(a portion of the Administrative Procedure Act); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the
United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) ("re-
quiring a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made' in order
for administrative action to survive arbitrary-and-capricious review," quoting Bur-
lington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
338. See, e.g., Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 5 at 384-85; Hensler, supra note 5
at 432.
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One might disagree with a rationale for a legal scheme (e.g., the
progressive income tax), and still grudgingly accept it. It is when
that rationale does not seem to be consistently employed (e.g., when
special interests appear to receive extraordinary tax breaks) that the
system appears unfair and the grumbling becomes especially intense.
The absence of a consistent rationale articulated by Congress, com-
bined with the problems regarding downstream transparency and ac-
countability (described above), cultivated perceptions of unfairness
regarding the Fund.
Notwithstanding this, the Special Master attempted to articulate
how the Fund would operate through the regulations and his com-
ments appended thereto. He also seems to have applied the regula-
tions in a consistent and reasonable manner. A series of juries
applying the same law to a series of cases presenting similar facts
would not have achieved results nearly as consistent as did the Fund
administrators. While some commentators have suggested that jus-
tice is better served through a series of inconsistent, unarticulated
jury awards,339 the consistency provided by the employment of a Spe-
cial Master and his professional staff contributed to the rationality of
the scheme.
6. Equality
The first stage of the upstream process provided as much equal-
ity as the American legislative process will allow. This entails,
among other things, a Senate in which representation is based on
statehood, not population, a Congress in which leadership has dispro-
portionate influence, 340 a president who is elected by the Electoral
College and not a popular plurality, and a system in which industry
lobbyists have substantial influence. 341 The notice and comment pe-
riod that preceded the adoption of the final regulations involved
339. See Priest, supra note 286, at 545 n.33, citing GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILLIP
BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). Calabresi and Bobbitt defend the use of juries of
randomly chosen laypersons sitting discontinuously and deciding responsibly - with-
out explanation - as appropriate for tragic decisions. However, it is the potential for
consistency in the decisions of the Fund's Special Master that provides for greater
fairness.
340. E.g., the constituents of House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) and House
Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-Tex.) had (through the prominent roles played by their
congressmen) more influence on the legislation establishing the Fund than, for exam-
ple, those of Congressmen Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.) and James P. Moran (D-Va.), in
whose districts the World Trade Center and Pentagon, respectively, were located.
341. Steven Brill describes a "tawdry scene of ... liquor-plying [airline industry]
lobbyists having their way with the House Majority Whip" on the eve of the ATSSSA's
enactment. BRILL, supra note 15, at 93. My colleague Nancy Welsh has asked me
216 [Vol. 10:135
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broader access, 342 but even here, some input (e.g., those of Senators
Hagel and Kennedy and others who were in close contact with Fein-
berg) may have carried greater influence than others. 34 3
Substantively, the equality criterion has a close connection to the
rationality criterion. One would like to think that the regulations
provided a basis for like cases being treated in like manner. But
Tyler and Thorisdottir have suggested that "the existence of at least
three possible standards of distributive fairness 344. .. invite[d] people
to interpret their situation in ways that bring principles more
favorable to themselves to bear on the issue of what is fair."345
Deborah Hensler observed that families invoking the equality princi-
ple would argue "that all victims, or all victims within a certain
group, should get paid the same amount," but other families invoking
the equity or need principle would argue just as forcefully for other
bases for compensation. 346 Fairness, and even equality, became a
relative matter in the eye of the beholder. But even as claimants may
have felt themselves subject to the Fund administrators' whims, the
claims process had less of a lottery aspect to it than the tort system,
as Senator McCain and others had hoped.347 In particular, awards
from the Fund were untainted by the racial and gender bias that too
often distorts conventional tort judgments and settlements. 348
why the executives at United and American Airlines did not take pains to meet with
the September llth victims to express regret regarding the role of their corporations
in the tragedy. See Jonathan Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
1009, 1016 (1999) (arguing that apology and forgiveness can be beneficial to both par-
ties). My short answer was that they had indeed met with the people whom they
considered most important: the congressional leaders and Bush Administration offi-
cials who could arrange a bailout of the airline industry and protect them from a
crippling spate of lawsuits. My long answer was that the airlines considered them-
selves the victims, succumbing to the "everyone's a victim" mentality that has taken
hold over much of American society. See Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Commu-
nitarianism: Where Rights Meet Responsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649 (1995);
ROBERT HUGHES, CULTURE OF COMPLAINT: THE FRAYING OF AMERICA (1994).
342. See supra text accompanying notes 51-58.
343. Brill describes how Special Master Feinberg was influenced by the informed
comments of victims' family members who wielded no political clout, but who had
simply done their homework. BRILL, supra note 15, at 324-25, 382-83.
344. For descriptions of these standards, based on equity, equality, and need, see
Hensler, supra note 5, at 434-35.
345. Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 5, at 371.
346. Hensler, supra note 5, at 434-35.
347. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
348. See Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for
Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 847 (1997); Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias:
Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1998); Frank M. McClellan, The
Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching for Racial Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761
(1996). To the extent the incomes of claimants or their deceased relatives had been
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7. Due Process
Our discussions of rationality and equality touched upon sub-
stantive due process issues, so here we will briefly examine procedu-
ral due process in connection with both upstream lawmaking and
downstream adjudication. Upstream, the ATSSSA was a product of a
legislative end-run around the usual process of committee hearings,
mark-ups, and debates, but for good reason. The emergency that
gave rise to the ATSSSA was tantamount to that surrounding a dec-
laration of war. Despite, or perhaps because of, the visible presence
of the airline industry and trial lawyers' lobbyists as the measure
was drafted, the short-circuited legislative process included genuine
debate (some public, most of it private) about the substantive issues
at stake.349 The regulations were a product of the notice and com-
ment procedure required by the Administrative Procedure Act,350
and the requirements were observed in more than just a formalistic
sense.
Individual claims to due process carry more weight with respect
to the law-applying that proceeds downstream than in the law-mak-
ing that occurs upstream. Every citizen does not have a right to no-
tice and hearing before Congress as it considers each measure that
may apply to him or her (although the APA does provide for some
rights with respect to administrative rule-making), but such rights
will attach when a court or agency applies those rules in a specific
case. 35 1 Downstream, the Fund would expose many of those accus-
tomed to formal courtroom procedure to a less formal administrative
process. The Fund's individual determinations lacked several of the
formal trappings that many Americans equate with due process. A
variety of legal and cultural norms, evidenced by formal documents
and popular culture, have impressed upon the American psyche the
notion that due process means a "day in court," and furthermore, that
that "day in court" means literally a day in court. Scores of popular
movies, from A Few Good Men to My Cousin Vinny, climax in a trial,
previously distorted by racial or sex discrimination, however, the Fund's compensa-
tion scheme kept this distortion largely intact.
349. See BRILL, supra note 15, at 81-85, 92-98 (describing the various proposals
and compromises made between House and Senate leaders, White House officials,
airline lobbyists, and victims' representatives).
350. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1996).
351. Compare, e.g., Londoner v. City and Co. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908)
(holding that the city council's decision involving a small group violated due process
because they were not afforded an opportunity to be heard), with Bi-Metallic Invest-
ment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado, 239 U.S. 441,445 (1915) (holding
that when a rule applies to a large group it is impractical for everyone to be heard).
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but very few portray an administrative hearing. The Fund replaced
formal evidentiary hearings before a black-robed judge with written
submissions and, if requested, informal conferences. 352
A moment's reflection would reveal to most Americans that they
in fact interact with the government's administrative apparatus (in-
cluding its decision-making component) on a routine basis; obtaining
a driver's license, filing a tax return, and mailing a letter all place the
citizen in contact with administrative agencies. Despite the cynicism
that attends much discourse about motor vehicle bureaus, the IRS,
and the Postal Service, these routine encounters usually conclude
satisfactorily and without rancor.35 3 But the events giving rise to the
Victim Compensation Fund were anything but routine, and to some,
the processing of claims through a mechanism less awe-inspiring
than a court seemed to suggest that important matters were not be-
ing taken seriously, that the tragic death of a loved one was being
dealt with in an arbitrary manner, and that the victims were being
relegated to second-class justice. As noted earlier, some critics re-
garded the Fund as a mere "shut up fund,"354 a device to get the Sep-
tember 11th victims and families out of the way, so that the airlines
and government could go about their business. To them, it was set up
to provide "small justice for small people," a complaint originated by
early critics of the alternative dispute resolution (hereinafter "ADR")
movement.355
352. Richard Delgado and others have expressed the view that "the formalities of a
court trial - the flag, the black robes, the ritual - remind those present that the occa-
sion calls for the higher, 'public' values, rather than the lesser values embraced dur-
ing moments of informality and intimacy." Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and
Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985
Wisc. L. REV. 1359, 1388 (1985). These and other norms "create a 'public conscience
and a standard for expected behavior that check overt signs of prejudice."' Id., quoting
G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 470 (25th Anniv. Ed. 1979).
353. The success of the Postal Service's REDRESS dispute resolution program, to-
gether with the more publicized triumphs of Lance Armstrong and his cycling team,
have helped restore the Postal Service's image recently. See Tina Nabatchi & Lisa B.
Bingham, Transformative Mediation in the USPS REDRESS & TM Program: Obser-
vations of ADR Specialists, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 399, 400 (2001). See also Sal
Ruibal, Armstrong's Joyride; Texan Takes Sixth Tour de France in Row, USA TODAY,
Jul. 26, 2004, at 1.
354. See David W. Chen, Many Relatives, Wary and Anguished, Shun Sept. 11
Fund, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2002, at B1; see also Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 5, at
356.
355. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984); Harry T.
Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV.
668 (1986); Delgado, supra note 352, at 1360 (expressing the concern that deformal-
ization of dispute resolution processes may increase the risk of class-based prejudice).
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These criticisms are misdirected. Studies of procedural justice
strongly suggest "that disputants are less concerned about receiving
formal due process.., than they are about being treated in a manner
that is consistent with their everyday expectations regarding social
relations and norms."356 Perceptions of procedural justice are en-
hanced to the extent that disputants perceive (1) that they have had
opportunity for voice, (2) that a third party considered their views,
concerns, and evidence, (3) that they were treated in a dignified, re-
spectful manner in a dignified procedure, and (4) that the decision-
maker was even-handed and attempted to be fair.3 5 7 These elements
were very much evident in the Fund's procedures, 358 although as
noted previously, issues of respect and fairness were matters very
much in the eye of the beholder. 35 9 And apart from the absence of
appeal, the Fund retained the traditional elements of due process,
notably: notice and opportunity to be heard, the right to counsel, and
the right to a determination by an impartial decision-maker. Devia-
tions from more formal processes were tailored to the purpose of the
Fund: to provide quick determination and payment of a substantial
award under a simplified no-fault system. The Fund allowed claim-
ants to avail themselves of the type of "quick and dirty solution" ad-
vocated by tort reformers such as Jeffrey O'Connell, who wished to
spare victims the travails of a cumbersome court-based process, sub-
stituting a less intimidating, more efficient, and more user-friendly
system.360
8. Efficiency
Efficiency was a major reason for the Fund, and because of both
the manner in which it was tailored and the laudable, professional
efforts of the Special Master and his staff, the efficiency goal was met.
Claims were processed expeditiously; the 120-day timeline was
strictly adhered to. An aid to efficiency, both upstream and down-
stream, was the absence of any real opposition to the concept of the
Fund or to the claims made by its beneficiaries. Congress passed the
ATSSSA quickly due to the sense of emergency (including the fate of
356. Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 312, at 826, citing Lind, supra note 313, at
187.
357. Id. at 820-21.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 314-18.
359. See supra notes 258-60 and 345-46 and accompanying text.
360. See Jeffrey O'Connell et al., The Costs of Consumer Choice for Auto Insurance
in States Without No-Fault Insurance, 54 MD. L. REV. 281, 282 (1995) (advocating an
automobile insurance no-fault system).
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the airline industry), the patriotic fervor of the moment, and the gen-
uine desire to help the September 11th victims. While different
stakeholders emphasized different aspects of compensation during
the rule-making process, the notice and comment period lacked the
clash of interests that attends more politically controversial rule-
making as, for example, in the field of environmental regulation. As-
pects of the regulations were attacked in court, not in an effort to
thwart the Fund, but rather as a means of perfecting rights under the
legislative scheme adopted for the Fund. Even as these attacks pro-
ceeded, the Fund was not impeded in its efforts to process claims.
The claims process itself, like many administrative proceedings,
was non-adversarial. It involved only the claimant and the adminis-
trative agency, and in this case, an agency whose interests were not
at all adverse to those of the persons appearing before it. Neither
Feinberg nor his deputies considered it their obligation to protect the
U.S. Treasury against genuine claims. The chief obstacle to effi-
ciency was time; the processing of the onslaught of claims that ar-
rived between the Schneider decision (in September 2003) and the
filing deadline (on December 22) posed a formidable task, but one
that was accomplished by the Fund's shutdown date of June 15, 2004.
Indeed, the very fact that the Fund had a limited life helped create
conditions conducive to the expeditious processing of claims. One
cannot set aside work for tomorrow if there is no tomorrow.
9. Promotion of Strong Civic Society
In a recently published book, Bob Cochran and I observed that
American law, like American culture, although dominated by individ-
ualist language, nevertheless evidences a quieter, communitarian
strain.361 The ATSSSA evidences this communitarian strain in that
its victim compensation and airline bailout provisions are efforts by
the American people to support the most direct and visible victims of
a terrorist attack on the nation. I have suggested earlier that a
strong civic society may have been further advanced by a more needs-
based formula for recovery, which would have minimized discord re-
garding economic inequality.3 62 By tapering recovery of economic
damages at the highest and lowest income levels and using an egali-
tarian formula for noneconomic damages, however, the Special
361. "In the law, the language of individual rights comes easily while the language
of community is more foreign." CocHRAN & AcKERMAN, supra note 1, at 1.
362. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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Master avoided the most extreme disparities, thereby softening the
differentiation between the "haves" and "have-nots."
Public choice theorists might claim that the September 11th vic-
tims (represented by the trial lawyers) and the airline industry sim-
ply prevailed in the ongoing clamor for "rents," and that ensuing
complaints about the Fund's compensation scheme once again
demonstrated the dominance of individualism in American legal cul-
ture.3 6 3 But only the most jaded cynic would not see in the Fund the
heartfelt desire to aid one's neighbor in time of need.36 4 The "town
meeting" format that Feinberg adopted first to obtain feedback re-
garding the proposed regulations and later to inform potential claim-
ants about the Fund's nuances served as a procedural device
conducive to promotion of a strong civic society. Feinberg was not
always greeted warmly at these meetings, which sometimes became
confrontational. Still, when confronted with complaints about
"greedy" victims' families, Kenneth Feinberg replied:
This Fund, and the comments of distressed family members, are
not abopt "greed" but, rather, reflect both the horror of Septem-
ber 11 and the determination of family members to value the life
of loved ones suddenly lost on that tragic day .... I believe that
America is unique in creating such a Fund that expresses the
compassion, concern, and determination of its people in coming
to the aid of the victims of September 11.365
Robert Rabin has noted that "[a] long and bitter contest over lia-
bility, stretching out over a period of years, in which families of Sep-
tember 11 victims had nothing beyond recriminations, bitterness,
and frustrations with 'the system,' almost certainly would have been
regarded as intolerable to the national community."366 Imperfect as
the Fund was, it spared both the families of victims and the larger
363. "Public choice [is] the economic study of nonmarket decision-making, or sim-
ply the application of economics to political science." Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 878 (1973), quoting
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1979). See also Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democ-
racy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707
(1991).
364. To those who would claim that the airline relief provisions of the ATSSSA
were yet another example of welfare capitalism, I would respond that the legislation
acknowledged the significance of the airline industry to the nation's economy and se-
curity and provided recognition of our mutual interdependence. Moreover, the subse-
quent administration of the loan guarantees and other aid demonstrated that the
government was not going to provide corporate handouts without sound basis (at least
through this program). See McCartney, supra note 232.
365. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,235 (Mar. 13,
2002) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104).
366. Rabin, supra note 8, at 771.
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American community the trauma of such a protracted process, al-
lowing the community to confront together the threat of terrorism
and related challenges. The fact that political partisanship and a di-
visive war in Iraq would, in a few short years, splinter the national
cohesion that developed after September 11th cannot and should not
be blamed on the Fund. In addition, the fact that a few potential
claimants chose to opt out of the Fund and pursue a tort remedy dis-
plays not the Fund's shortcomings, but the value our society places
on individual autonomy, even as it pursues the collective good.
10. Personal Autonomy
The United States court system has long honored the principles
of individual choice in pursuit of legitimate ends. More recently, pro-
ponents of alternative means of dispute resolution have espoused the
use of processes that place a premium on individual autonomy.
36 7
Procedural justice research supports the view that "high process con-
trol for disputants tends to enhance procedural fairness."368 In the
course of describing the core values of democratic governance, Reu-
ben goes so far as to say that "personal autonomy should be seen as a
unifying and synthesizing value that can have a dominating or
trumping effect when other supporting democratic values are in
tension."36 9
As a communitarian, I am cautious about embracing this concept
as wholeheartedly as Reuben and others might. Certainly, Western
political and legal thought since the Enlightenment has placed a high
value on individual autonomy. 3 70 Some of us, however, would hesi-
tate to describe self-actualization as an all-trumping value of our le-
gal or political system.3 7 1 A process established by Congress,
employing the United States Treasury to compensate individuals and
families who have sustained direct losses in a national tragedy may
have legitimate objectives in addition to the promotion of personal
autonomy. Still, the chief reason for establishing the Fund (apart
367. Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Con-
nected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1 (2001).
368. LIND & TYLER, supra note 120, at 94.
369. See Reuben, supra note 297, at 287.
370. See id. at 286, citing Lester G. Crocker, Introduction to THE AGE OF ENLIGHT-
ENMENT 3 (Lester G. Crocker ed., 1969). See also Reuben, supra note 297, at n.40-42
(see generally the works of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Wood).
371. See Ackerman, supra note 12, at 84 (noting how the discussion of client val-
ues is often steered towards selfish ends rather than communitarian principles). See
also AMITAI ETZIONI, SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 26 (1993).
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from the airline bailout) was to assist the September 11th victims
and their families, and it is altogether appropriate to consider how
the Fund has served the value of personal autonomy or, more collo-
quially, personal choice. 37 2
I would assert that the Fund accomplished this quite well. Per-
sonal autonomy has little meaning in the context of the upstream
law-making process, apart from the participatory features we have
discussed earlier. But downstream, the availability of real choice,
particularly in the manner of participation, loomed large. First, po-
tential claimants could choose between assured recovery from the
Fund and the riskier possibility of litigation which, as discussed ear-
lier, may have served certain needs better than the Fund. The Fund
itself presented some procedural choices: to make a paper submis-
sion, followed (if the claimant so chose) by an oral hearing (through
Track A), or to proceed directly to the oral hearing (through Track
B). 3 73 And these choices were apt to be informed ones. The various
assistance sites and other sources of information established by Fein-
berg's office, together with volunteer assistance through organiza-
tions such as Trial Lawyers Care, allowed Fund beneficiaries to make
real choices, rather than just making blind stabs in the dark. Fur-
thermore, support from charities, life insurance, and other programs
in the months immediately following September 11th provided suffi-
cient interim relief for most claimants to carefully consider whether
or not to file a claim with the Fund.3 74
B. Limited Objectives and Reasonable Expectations
As suggested above, retention of the litigation alternative (albeit
in modified form) is consistent with our interest in personal auton-
omy. Therefore, despite the attributes of the Fund, it is not for us to
find fault in those who, for reasons of their own, chose to pursue liti-
gation under § 408 of the ATSSSA, or, for that matter, those who
chose to do nothing at all. We have already catalogued some very
legitimate reasons some people might choose these courses of ac-
tion. 37 5 For the great majority of claimants, the certainty of recovery,
the need for closure, and the desire for administrative convenience
worked in favor of a claim against the Fund. For at least a few, how-
ever, other concerns - the need for accountability, the desire for a
372. See Reuben, supra note 297, at 303-04.
373. 28 C.F.R. § 104.31(b).
374. DIXON & STERN, supra note 79, at 31.
375. See supra text accompanying notes 197-209.
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more ornate process, a reluctance to accept a check from the govern-
ment - made litigation the more desirable route. Moreover, a very
small number of people apparently chose to avoid altogether the "tyr-
anny of participation," 376 making no claim whatsoever. That the
Fund proved to be the better choice for most need not have made it
the best choice for all.
The Fund itself should be evaluated in light of reasonable expec-
tations. No single remedy - not the Fund, not the tort system, not
any process devised by man - can fully compensate victims of a trag-
edy on the scale of September 11th, nor can any such process fully
restore a sense of moral balance in the face of such evil. Bernard
Mayer has written about the different dimensions of conflict and its
resolution, distinguishing between cognitive, emotional, and behav-
ioral dimensions.37 7 Mayer observes that no single device can fully
satisfy the need for resolution in each dimension:
Full resolution of conflict occurs only when there is resolution
along all three dimensions: cognitive, emotional, and behav-
ioral. But such closure does not often happen in a neat, orderly,
synchronized manner .... Although resolution along one di-
mension encourages resolution along the other dimensions, the
reverse is also true. People in conflict may experience a signifi-
cant setback in their progress toward resolution in one dimen-
sion when they do not experience progress along another.
Furthermore, different disputants in a conflict often experience
differing degrees of resolution along the various dimensions. 378
The Fund was not designed to do complete justice. At best, it
could compensate for out-of-pocket expenses, prevent financial hard-
ship, and serve as a tangible expression of the sympathy and compas-
sion of the American people. Its purpose was not to replace a spouse,
parent, or child, but to replace the income that person would have
provided; not to fully compensate for the pain and suffering exper-
ienced by a fallen victim and his or her family, but to recognize it in a
tangible way.
Other processes have been put in place to achieve different ends
relating to the events of September 11th. The National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (popularly known as the
"September 11 Commission") was established, largely due to pressure
from victims' families, to seek information about just how the events
of September 11th transpired, including an effort to determine what
376. See MAYER, supra note 283, at 54.
377. BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 98-108 (2000).
378. Id. at 108.
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lapses - particularly by government entities - may have allowed the
tragic events to occur.379 The political process (with respect to gov-
ernment actors) and the market (with respect to private actors, such
as the airlines) remain available to impose responsibility on those
whom the community-at-large deems to have acted negligently. A
few claimants have pursued litigation with this objective, and their
efforts might uncover useful information. To the extent liability is
imposed as a consequence of such litigation, it might have a deterrent
effect as to future conduct, thereby having an effect on the market as
well. 38 0 The hunt for Osama bin Laden continues so that we might
someday exact vengeance and restore some sense of moral balance. 38 1
That hunt, together with other aspects of the War on Terrorism,382 is
also a means of promoting another goal: adequate national security
in a world we now recognize as more dangerous as a consequence of
the events of September 11th. Finally, we can hope that the Septem-
ber 11th victims and their families will find some succor, if not com-
plete healing, through the compassion and support of their families,
friends, religious congregations and communities. 38 3 To expect the
Fund to serve all or even most of these functions is to rely too much
on any single mechanism.
379. See Titles I and VI, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub.
L. No. 107-306, 116 Stat. 2383, 2408-13 (2002) (creating the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States). An acceleration of filings with the Fund
occurred as the September 11th Commission was stepping up its work in a visible
way, but that acceleration is almost certainly more attributable to the approach of the
filing deadline than to any activity by the Commission.
380. Because most September 11th victims and families filed with the Fund and
did not pursue § 408 claims, any tort judgments will not reflect the full damage in-
curred on September 11th. These judgments, because they will not have imposed the
full costs on the defendants, may be viewed as having an inadequate deterrent effect.
However, to make the available defendants (e.g., airlines, security firms, World Trade
Center owners, an aircraft manufacturer) liable for the full costs of the September
11th tragedy would impose upon them liability far in excess of their culpability.
381. While unlikely to be realized as a remedy, the Act maintains the possibility of
a civil action against bin Laden and other terrorists. See ATSSSA § 408(c).
382. I will leave for another forum the question of whether conduct such as the
invasion of Iraq serves to advance the War on Terrorism.
383. Andrew McThenia and Tom Shaffer have recognized that people are most
likely to get justice from sources other than the government:
Justice is not usually something people get from the government. And courts
... are not the only or even the most important places that dispense jus-
tice .... Justice is not the will of the stronger; it is not efficiency in govern-
ment; it is not the reduction of violence; justice is what we discover - you and
I, Socrates said - when we walk together, listen together, and even love one
another, in our curiosity about what justice is and where justice comes from.
Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660,
1664-65 (1985).
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The failure of the Fund or its chief administrator to meet all the
needs of the victims and their families cannot be attributed to the
shortcomings of the administrative process, or to the rules estab-
lished for the Fund's operation. The Fund falls short only when mea-
sured against the unrealistic expectation that a legal process
established to provide economic compensation for harm will bring
about a complete healing to those who have experienced heartbreak-
ing loss. Such expectations exceed the capacity of the most carefully
crafted procedures and the fairest and most compassionate of com-
pensation schemes. In the final analysis, the Fund and its adminis-
trators performed admirably. Said the New York Times as the Fund
concluded its work:
Congress had two purposes in mind when it established the Vic-
tim Compensation Fund after 9/11. One was economic: to pro-
vide the families of the World Trade Center victims with prompt
and fair compensation in exchange for their agreement not to
sue the airlines and send them into bankruptcy. The other was
to provide a compassionate and collective response to an act of
shocking barbarity .... [Tihe Fund did the task it was given.
The airlines got the protection they needed. The American peo-
ple made a national gesture of sympathy to the bereaved fami-
lies. The families themselves were able to get compensation
through a quicker and simpler route than litigation. In a story
with no happy endings, it's good to see this satisfactory one. 38 4
VI. CONCLUSION
For the most part, the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund was a success. The Fund awarded $7,049,415,537 in compensa-
tion to 5560 victims and their families in the course of two years. 38 5
It did so expeditiously, with a minimum of expense and inconve-
nience to its beneficiaries. The Fund succeeded in providing compen-
sation to the immediate victims of the horrors of September 11th. At
the very least, it provided these victims the material wherewithal to
get on with their lives, and in most cases, it provided substantially
more than that. The Fund also served to insulate the airline industry
from devastating tort liability. The Fund succeeded only somewhat
in conveying a sense of the compassion of the American people. To
384. Editorial, supra note 6.
385. Final Report of the Special Master for the September 11th Victim Compensa-
tion Fund of 2001, 110, Table 12: General Award Statistics for Deceased Victims and
General Award Statistics for Physical Injury Victims, at http:/www.usdoj.gov/final-
report.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
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the extent it failed in this regard, it was (1) because some benefi-
ciaries, having sustained such severe tragedy, did not want to believe
that anything good could come of the events of September 11th, and
(2) because the norms of American tort law had conditioned them and
their lawyers to look askance at a process and compensation formula
that did not fully replicate the familiar tort system. But for most
beneficiaries, the Fund offered a tangible means of reconstructing
their lives and provided an element of closure.
Fretting about the details is something American lawyers, and
especially legal academicians, do particularly well. The Fund was de-
ficient in two major respects: (1) the statute's failure to articulate a
clear formula for recovery and (2) the absence of any appeal of the
Special Master's determinations. Both of these deficiencies were con-
sequences of hastily drafted statutory language. Both were cured to
a great extent in the administrative process, by (1) the articulation of
a formula for recovery for most victims in the regulations and (2) the
fair and careful manner in which the Special Master and his staff
considered and determined the awards.
A few lasting lessons may be gleaned from the experience. The
unusual events of September 11, 2001 gave rise, through the
ATSSSA, to a unique combination of welfare capitalism and genuine
humanitarianism that is not likely to be duplicated in the foreseeable
future. The Fund's event-specific compensation scheme was too
costly to serve as a model for a more widespread plan of relief for
victims of terrorism or for large-scale tort reform. In the Fund we
saw evidence of the endowment effect of traditional substantive and
procedural norms for recovery for personal injury, and how quickly a
generous expression of the American people's compassion can be
transformed into an entitlement. We also saw how the administra-
tive process can be used to reshape a vague Congressional mandate
into a workable program, and how a skillful, professional effort can
avoid some of the costs and uncertainties of traditional compensation
systems. Finally we saw, from the bittersweet experience of Kenneth
Feinberg and his staff, that no good deed goes unpunished.
On June 15, 2004, Special Master Kenneth Feinberg closed the
Fund for business and paid a quiet visit to the President. 38 6 No
bands played, no champagne corks popped for the Victim Compensa-
tion Fund. That is as it should be. The Fund, born out of tragedy,
will never be cause for celebration. It will not bring happiness. It
will not mend broken hearts or establish full justice. Those of us who
386. See Editorial, supra note 6.
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try to derive meaning from tragedy may have to be content with the
fact that an agency established by Congress to provide tangible relief
to the direct victims of a national trauma did so fairly and efficiently,
and then quietly closed its doors.
